Yves Oytana
Biographic Data
| ID | 5928231 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Yves Oytana |
| GIVEN NAMES | Yves |
| FAMILY NAME | Oytana |
| SIGNATURE | OYTANA Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | EconomiX |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1383-4974 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
How is digital evidence used in the international criminal court? An exploratory analysis
Artificial intelligence, inattention and liability rules
Presumption of Innocence and Deterrence
Prodefendant rules in criminal procedure, such as the presumption of innocence, are usually suspected of undermining deterrence. We investigate the soundness of this claim in a model in which criminal-law enforcers decide about their investigating effort under either the presumption of innocence or the presumption of guilt. We show, under some conditions, that the presumption of innocence may minimize the social costs of crime, when compared to t…
Les coûts des expertises judiciaires dans les procédures inquisitoire et accusatoire
Nous comparons les procédures inquisitoire et accusatoire en nous basant sur le modèle de référence de Dewatripont et Tirole [1999], selon deux critères : le coût espéré des expertises et le coût espéré des erreurs. Notre apport principal concerne le coût des efforts de recherche des experts. Nous supposons qu’un expert peut profiter d’économies (ou de déséconomies) d’échelle lors de la conduite de ses expertises. Lorsque les économies d’échelle …
The Judicial Expert in a Two-Tier Hierarchy
We study how the presence of biased expertise influences judicial decision-making. When an appeals-court judge's decision depends only on the information he gets about the expertise proceedings, a perfectly separating equilibrium may arise in which the losing litigant appeals only if the trial-court judge's decision is incorrect. Surprisingly enough, an increase in the probability that the expertise is biased and a decrease in the level of scruti…
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The Judicial Expert in a Two-Tier Hierarchy
We study how the presence of biased expertise influences judicial decision-making. When an appeals-court judge's decision depends only on the information he gets about the expertise proceedings, a perfectly separating equilibrium may arise in which the losing litigant appeals only if the trial-court judge's decision is incorrect. Surprisingly enough, an increase in the probability that the expertise is biased and a decrease in the level of scruti…
Les coûts des expertises judiciaires dans les procédures inquisitoire et accusatoire
Nous comparons les procédures inquisitoire et accusatoire en nous basant sur le modèle de référence de Dewatripont et Tirole [1999], selon deux critères : le coût espéré des expertises et le coût espéré des erreurs. Notre apport principal concerne le coût des efforts de recherche des experts. Nous supposons qu’un expert peut profiter d’économies (ou de déséconomies) d’échelle lors de la conduite de ses expertises. Lorsque les économies d’échelle …
Presumption of Innocence and Deterrence
Prodefendant rules in criminal procedure, such as the presumption of innocence, are usually suspected of undermining deterrence. We investigate the soundness of this claim in a model in which criminal-law enforcers decide about their investigating effort under either the presumption of innocence or the presumption of guilt. We show, under some conditions, that the presumption of innocence may minimize the social costs of crime, when compared to t…
Artificial intelligence, inattention and liability rules
How is digital evidence used in the international criminal court? An exploratory analysis
Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (4 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence in Law (1 work) · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance (1 work) · Bayesian probability (1 work)