Thomas Boyer‐Kassem
Biographic Data
| ID | 5928987 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Thomas Boyer‐Kassem |
| GIVEN NAMES | Thomas |
| FAMILY NAME | Boyer‐Kassem |
| SIGNATURE | KASSEM T B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Archives Henri-Poincaré - Philosophie et Recherches sur les Sciences et les Technologies |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7621-0253 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 9 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Reasonable Precaution or Unjust Discrimination? Applying a Lexical Utility Model of the Precautionary Principle to Moral Choices
Explaining Scientific Collaboration
For two centuries, collaborative research has become increasingly widespread. Various explanations of this trend have been proposed. Here, we offer a novel functional explanation of it. It differs from ac- counts like that of Wray (2002) by the precise socio-epistemic mech- anism that grounds the beneficialness of collaboration. Boyer-Kassem and Imbert (2015) show how minor differences in the step-efficiency of collaborative groups can make them …
Scientific Expertise and Risk Aggregation
When scientists are asked to give expert advice on risk-related questions, such as the authorization of medical drugs, deliberation often does not eliminate all disagreements. I propose to model these remaining discrepancies as differences in risk assessments and/or in risk acceptability thresholds. The normative question I consider, then, is how the individual expert views should best be aggregated. I discuss what “best” could mean, with an eye …
Improving Deliberations by Reducing Misrepresentation Effects
Deliberative and decisional groups play crucial roles in most aspects of social life. But it is not obvious how to organize these groups and various socio-cognitive mechanisms can spoil debates and decisions. In this paper we focus on one such important mechanism: the misrepresentation of views, i.e. when agents express views that are aligned with those already expressed, and which differ from their private opinions. We introduce a model to analy…
Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge
Descartes once argued that, with sufficient effort and skill, a single scientist could uncover fundamental truths about our world. Contemporary science proves the limits of this claim. From synthesizing the human genome to predicting the effects of climate change, some current scientific research requires the collaboration of hundreds (if not thousands) of scientists with various specializations. Additionally, the majority of published scientific…
Une nouvelle approche expérimentale pour tester les modèles quantiques de l’erreur de conjonction
La théorie classique des probabilités requiert que la probabilité de la conjonction de deux événements soit inférieure à la probabilité d’un des événements seul. Or les sujets ne jugent empiriquement pas toujours ainsi : c’est la traditionnelle erreur de conjonction. L’une des explications actuellement prometteuses de ce paradoxe repose sur des modèles dits quantiques, développés à partir des outils mathématiques de la mécanique quantique. Mais c…
Testing quantum-like models of judgment for question order effect
Scientific Collaboration
Epistemic accounts of scientific collaboration usually assume that, one way or another, two heads really are more than twice better than one. We show that this hypothesis is unduly strong. We present a deliberately crude model with unfavorable hypotheses. We show that, even then, when the priority rule is applied, large differences in successfulness can emerge from small differences in efficiency, with sometimes increasing marginal returns. We em…
Is a bird in the hand worth two in the bush? Or, whether scientists should publish intermediate results
Le principe de précaution
Is a bird in the hand worth two in the bush? Or, whether scientists should publish intermediate results
Scientific Collaboration
Epistemic accounts of scientific collaboration usually assume that, one way or another, two heads really are more than twice better than one. We show that this hypothesis is unduly strong. We present a deliberately crude model with unfavorable hypotheses. We show that, even then, when the priority rule is applied, large differences in successfulness can emerge from small differences in efficiency, with sometimes increasing marginal returns. We em…
Le principe de précaution
Is a bird in the hand worth two in the bush? Or, whether scientists should publish intermediate results
Scientific Collaboration
Epistemic accounts of scientific collaboration usually assume that, one way or another, two heads really are more than twice better than one. We show that this hypothesis is unduly strong. We present a deliberately crude model with unfavorable hypotheses. We show that, even then, when the priority rule is applied, large differences in successfulness can emerge from small differences in efficiency, with sometimes increasing marginal returns. We em…
Testing quantum-like models of judgment for question order effect
Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge
Descartes once argued that, with sufficient effort and skill, a single scientist could uncover fundamental truths about our world. Contemporary science proves the limits of this claim. From synthesizing the human genome to predicting the effects of climate change, some current scientific research requires the collaboration of hundreds (if not thousands) of scientists with various specializations. Additionally, the majority of published scientific…
Une nouvelle approche expérimentale pour tester les modèles quantiques de l’erreur de conjonction
La théorie classique des probabilités requiert que la probabilité de la conjonction de deux événements soit inférieure à la probabilité d’un des événements seul. Or les sujets ne jugent empiriquement pas toujours ainsi : c’est la traditionnelle erreur de conjonction. L’une des explications actuellement prometteuses de ce paradoxe repose sur des modèles dits quantiques, développés à partir des outils mathématiques de la mécanique quantique. Mais c…
Improving Deliberations by Reducing Misrepresentation Effects
Deliberative and decisional groups play crucial roles in most aspects of social life. But it is not obvious how to organize these groups and various socio-cognitive mechanisms can spoil debates and decisions. In this paper we focus on one such important mechanism: the misrepresentation of views, i.e. when agents express views that are aligned with those already expressed, and which differ from their private opinions. We introduce a model to analy…
Scientific Expertise and Risk Aggregation
When scientists are asked to give expert advice on risk-related questions, such as the authorization of medical drugs, deliberation often does not eliminate all disagreements. I propose to model these remaining discrepancies as differences in risk assessments and/or in risk acceptability thresholds. The normative question I consider, then, is how the individual expert views should best be aggregated. I discuss what “best” could mean, with an eye …
Explaining Scientific Collaboration
For two centuries, collaborative research has become increasingly widespread. Various explanations of this trend have been proposed. Here, we offer a novel functional explanation of it. It differs from ac- counts like that of Wray (2002) by the precise socio-epistemic mech- anism that grounds the beneficialness of collaboration. Boyer-Kassem and Imbert (2015) show how minor differences in the step-efficiency of collaborative groups can make them …
Reasonable Precaution or Unjust Discrimination? Applying a Lexical Utility Model of the Precautionary Principle to Moral Choices
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Law and economics (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works)