Julien Jacqmin
Biographic Data
| ID | 5929581 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Julien Jacqmin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Julien |
| FAMILY NAME | Jacqmin |
| SIGNATURE | JACQMIN J |
| AFFILIATIONS | NEOMA Business School |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3275-366X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The invisible students
For-profit higher education institutions have expanded rapidly in France, yet no reliable administrative data exist to measure their enrolment. Existing public figures suggest that between 8 and 15 percent of students attend for-profit institutions. This broad range reflects a deeper problem: many invisible students who are missing from official statistics. This article addresses three questions: (1) how and why has enrolment in for-profit higher…
Can students help us better rank higher education institutions? The case of French business schools
Revealed preference rankings, using data from student admission platforms, present an alternative to conventional academic rankings whose reference criteria are fluctuating and manipulable. We show how admission procedures, whether centralized or decentralized, generate raw information about individual student preferences that can be exploited to construct rankings. Next, we examine the case of the SIGEM ranking of French business schools, an ori…
Sigem
La procédure centralisée du SIGEM est en charge de l’affectation des candidats reçus aux concours des grandes écoles de management en France. Elle est basée sur l’utilisation d’un algorithme connu qui correspond à la version « écoles » de l’algorithme de Gale et Shapley [1962]. Les résultats théoriques des modèles d’appariement, liés à cet algorithme, permettent d’identifier des propriétés fondamentales satisfaites par la procédure. Certains part…
The effect of international accreditations on students’ revealed preferences
Optimal grid tariffs with heterogeneous prosumers
Does sector-specific experience matter? The case of European higher education ministers
Does sector-specific experience matter? The case of European higher education ministers
Optimal grid tariffs with heterogeneous prosumers
The effect of international accreditations on students’ revealed preferences
Sigem
La procédure centralisée du SIGEM est en charge de l’affectation des candidats reçus aux concours des grandes écoles de management en France. Elle est basée sur l’utilisation d’un algorithme connu qui correspond à la version « écoles » de l’algorithme de Gale et Shapley [1962]. Les résultats théoriques des modèles d’appariement, liés à cet algorithme, permettent d’identifier des propriétés fondamentales satisfaites par la procédure. Certains part…
Can students help us better rank higher education institutions? The case of French business schools
Revealed preference rankings, using data from student admission platforms, present an alternative to conventional academic rankings whose reference criteria are fluctuating and manipulable. We show how admission procedures, whether centralized or decentralized, generate raw information about individual student preferences that can be exploited to construct rankings. Next, we examine the case of the SIGEM ranking of French business schools, an ori…
The invisible students
For-profit higher education institutions have expanded rapidly in France, yet no reliable administrative data exist to measure their enrolment. Existing public figures suggest that between 8 and 15 percent of students attend for-profit institutions. This broad range reflects a deeper problem: many invisible students who are missing from official statistics. This article addresses three questions: (1) how and why has enrolment in for-profit higher…
Mathematics (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Higher education (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Preference (2 works)