Steffen Minter
Biographic Data
| ID | 5935109 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Steffen Minter |
| GIVEN NAMES | Steffen |
| FAMILY NAME | Minter |
| SIGNATURE | MINTER S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Freiburg |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Sanctions for repeat offenders
In a two‐period standard law‐enforcement model, individuals observe or break the law. In addition, individuals may offend accidentally. When sanctions are limited by individual wealth constraints, the government chooses appropriate sanctions for first and repeat offenders and the level of monitoring. We assume a welfare‐oriented government and derive subgame‐perfect equilibria for constant, increasing and decreasing sanctions depending on the ind…
Irregular Immigration
Irregular immigration is at the forefront of the political and public debate in the European Union. Images of desperate people arriving at the southern shores of the EU regularly dominate the media coverage. In this book, Steffen Minter focuses on the coordination problems between EU Member States in dealing with immigrants and refugees entering the EU. The author demonstrates that the enforcement of the external EU border constitutes a public go…
No prominent works on this page.
Irregular Immigration
Irregular immigration is at the forefront of the political and public debate in the European Union. Images of desperate people arriving at the southern shores of the EU regularly dominate the media coverage. In this book, Steffen Minter focuses on the coordination problems between EU Member States in dealing with immigrants and refugees entering the EU. The author demonstrates that the enforcement of the external EU border constitutes a public go…
Sanctions for repeat offenders
In a two‐period standard law‐enforcement model, individuals observe or break the law. In addition, individuals may offend accidentally. When sanctions are limited by individual wealth constraints, the government chooses appropriate sanctions for first and repeat offenders and the level of monitoring. We assume a welfare‐oriented government and derive subgame‐perfect equilibria for constant, increasing and decreasing sanctions depending on the ind…
Economics (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (1 works) · Development economics (1 works) · Economic Order, Economic Policy (1 works) · Economic policy (1 works) · Economic system (1 works) · emigration and immigration (1 works) · Enforcement (1 works)