Patrizio Tirelli
Biographic Data
| ID | 5935381 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Patrizio Tirelli |
| GIVEN NAMES | Patrizio |
| FAMILY NAME | Tirelli |
| SIGNATURE | TIRELLI P |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Milano-Bicocca |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0171-8861 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1994 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Broadband shocks, TFP growth and polarisation of European firms
Informality and the labor market effects of financial crises
Reinterpreting social pacts
Incomplete Information in Monetary Policy Games
Time inconsistency in monetary policy can be addressed appointing a conservative central banker. But incomplete information about the central banker's preferences impairs the performance of delegation schemes. Firstly, the ensuing ex‐ante variability of monetary response lowers welfare. Secondly, partial independence schemes may prove inadequate because reputation — not only legal arrangements — defines the actual degree of independence. The incu…
Simple Rules, Fiscal Policy and Wealth Targets in a Monetary Union. An Alternative to the Maastricht Guidelines
This paper is concerned with the macroeconomics of asymmetric shocks in a two-country monetary union. Three alternative fiscal rules are considered: (1) no fiscal response; (2) in each country the fiscal stance is expansionary if national wealth is above target and vice versa; and (3) national fiscal policies are centralized and target the union external wealth. The results are assessed from two different angles. The first is the point of view of…
Simple Rules, Fiscal Policy and Wealth Targets in a Monetary Union. An Alternative to the Maastricht Guidelines
This paper is concerned with the macroeconomics of asymmetric shocks in a two-country monetary union. Three alternative fiscal rules are considered: (1) no fiscal response; (2) in each country the fiscal stance is expansionary if national wealth is above target and vice versa; and (3) national fiscal policies are centralized and target the union external wealth. The results are assessed from two different angles. The first is the point of view of…
Incomplete Information in Monetary Policy Games
Time inconsistency in monetary policy can be addressed appointing a conservative central banker. But incomplete information about the central banker's preferences impairs the performance of delegation schemes. Firstly, the ensuing ex‐ante variability of monetary response lowers welfare. Secondly, partial independence schemes may prove inadequate because reputation — not only legal arrangements — defines the actual degree of independence. The incu…
Reinterpreting social pacts
Informality and the labor market effects of financial crises
Broadband shocks, TFP growth and polarisation of European firms
Economics (4 works) · Monetary policy (3 works) · Economic Policies and Impacts (2 works) · European union (2 works) · Keynesian economics (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Macroeconomics (2 works) · Market economy (2 works) · Monetary economics (2 works)