Joseph Gottlieb
Biographic Data
| ID | 5965856 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Joseph Gottlieb |
| GIVEN NAMES | Joseph |
| FAMILY NAME | Gottlieb |
| SIGNATURE | GOTTLIEB J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Texas Tech University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9014-8487 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 12 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
How LLMs might think
Do large language models (“LLMs”) think? Daniel Stoljar and Zhihe Vincent Zhang have recently developed an argument from rationality for the claim that LLMs do not think. We contend, however, that the argument from rationality not only falters, but leaves open an intriguing possibility: that LLMs engage only in arational, associative forms of thinking and have purely associative minds. Our positive claim is that if LLMs think at all, they likely …
Counting subjects
We normally assume that there’s just one conscious individual per animal. Some question this, suggesting that there may be nonhuman taxonomic groups whose normal, adult members house more than one conscious subject. Call this the multitudes view (‘MV)’. Our aim is methodological: we hope to understand how we might assess whether MV is true. To that end, we distinguish two strategies for counting conscious subjects: the duplication strategy and th…
Minds Matter
Many claim that there is an important relationship between consciousness and welfare. Call this general view phenomenalism . One way of fleshing out phenomenalism is to hold that consciousness is what makes one the type of entity that can be noninstrumentally better or worse off in the first place. Consciousness is at least a necessary condition on welfare subjecthood . A different account holds that even if consciousness is not necessary for wel…
The possible worlds theory of visual experience
When we watch movies, or are tricked by a trompe-l'oeil painting, we seem to be visually representing possible worlds; often non-actual possible worlds. This suggests that we really can visually represent possible worlds. The suggested claim is refined and developed here into a theory of visual experience that holds that all visual experiences, both veridical and non-veridical, represent possible worlds, many of which are non-actual
The Ethical Implications of Panpsychism
The history of philosophy is a history of moral circle expansion. This history correlates with a history of expansionism about consciousness. Recently, expansionism about consciousness has exploded: to invertebrates, to plants, to logic gates, and to fundamental entities. The last of these expansions stems from a surge of interest in panpsychism. In an exploratory spirit, this paper considers some largely uncharted territory: the ethical implicat…
Self-Experience Despite Self-Elusiveness
Descartes’ God is a deceiver, and that’s OK
The Higher-Order Map Theory of Consciousness
I begin by developing a challenge for the Higher-Order Thought variant of Higher-Order representational theories of consciousness. The challenge is to account for the distinctive phenomenal character of visual experience—its presentational character. After setting out the challenge, I articulate a novel form of Higher-Order theory that can account for presentational character—the Map Theory of consciousness. The theory’s distinctive claim is that…
Persistence Without Personhood
I am a person. But am I fundamentally and essentially a person? The animalist says no. So must the phenomenal continuity theorist, or so I’ll argue. Even if, contra animalism, we cannot survive zombification, being a subject of experience is not sufficient for being a person, and phenomenal continuity is not sufficient for our survival as the same person. These observations point the way to a positive account of personhood, and provide further in…
When nothing looks blue
On ambitious higher-order theories of consciousness
Ambitious Higher-order theories of consciousness – Higher-order theories that purport to give an account of phenomenal consciousness – face a well-known objection from the possibility of radical misrepresentation. Jonathan Farrell has recently added a new twist to an old worry: while higher-order theorists have the resources to respond to the misrepresentation objection, they do so at the expense of their ambitions. At best, they only account for…
Consciousness and the limits of memory
Consciousness and the limits of memory
On ambitious higher-order theories of consciousness
Ambitious Higher-order theories of consciousness – Higher-order theories that purport to give an account of phenomenal consciousness – face a well-known objection from the possibility of radical misrepresentation. Jonathan Farrell has recently added a new twist to an old worry: while higher-order theorists have the resources to respond to the misrepresentation objection, they do so at the expense of their ambitions. At best, they only account for…
When nothing looks blue
The Higher-Order Map Theory of Consciousness
I begin by developing a challenge for the Higher-Order Thought variant of Higher-Order representational theories of consciousness. The challenge is to account for the distinctive phenomenal character of visual experience—its presentational character. After setting out the challenge, I articulate a novel form of Higher-Order theory that can account for presentational character—the Map Theory of consciousness. The theory’s distinctive claim is that…
Persistence Without Personhood
I am a person. But am I fundamentally and essentially a person? The animalist says no. So must the phenomenal continuity theorist, or so I’ll argue. Even if, contra animalism, we cannot survive zombification, being a subject of experience is not sufficient for being a person, and phenomenal continuity is not sufficient for our survival as the same person. These observations point the way to a positive account of personhood, and provide further in…
Self-Experience Despite Self-Elusiveness
Descartes’ God is a deceiver, and that’s OK
The possible worlds theory of visual experience
When we watch movies, or are tricked by a trompe-l'oeil painting, we seem to be visually representing possible worlds; often non-actual possible worlds. This suggests that we really can visually represent possible worlds. The suggested claim is refined and developed here into a theory of visual experience that holds that all visual experiences, both veridical and non-veridical, represent possible worlds, many of which are non-actual
The Ethical Implications of Panpsychism
The history of philosophy is a history of moral circle expansion. This history correlates with a history of expansionism about consciousness. Recently, expansionism about consciousness has exploded: to invertebrates, to plants, to logic gates, and to fundamental entities. The last of these expansions stems from a surge of interest in panpsychism. In an exploratory spirit, this paper considers some largely uncharted territory: the ethical implicat…
How LLMs might think
Do large language models (“LLMs”) think? Daniel Stoljar and Zhihe Vincent Zhang have recently developed an argument from rationality for the claim that LLMs do not think. We contend, however, that the argument from rationality not only falters, but leaves open an intriguing possibility: that LLMs engage only in arational, associative forms of thinking and have purely associative minds. Our positive claim is that if LLMs think at all, they likely …
Counting subjects
We normally assume that there’s just one conscious individual per animal. Some question this, suggesting that there may be nonhuman taxonomic groups whose normal, adult members house more than one conscious subject. Call this the multitudes view (‘MV)’. Our aim is methodological: we hope to understand how we might assess whether MV is true. To that end, we distinguish two strategies for counting conscious subjects: the duplication strategy and th…
Minds Matter
Many claim that there is an important relationship between consciousness and welfare. Call this general view phenomenalism . One way of fleshing out phenomenalism is to hold that consciousness is what makes one the type of entity that can be noninstrumentally better or worse off in the first place. Consciousness is at least a necessary condition on welfare subjecthood . A different account holds that even if consciousness is not necessary for wel…
Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 works) · Consciousness (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Philosophy of mind (3 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works)