Jonathan Brink Morgan
Biographic Data
| ID | 5966041 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jonathan Brink Morgan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jonathan Brink |
| FAMILY NAME | Morgan |
| SIGNATURE | MORGAN J B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Montclair State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9213-1523 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
What the Senses Cannot ‘Say’
Some have claimed that there are laws of appearance, i.e. in principle constraints on which types of sensory experiences are possible. Within a representationalist framework, these laws amount to restrictions on what a given experience can represent. I offer an in-depth defence of one such law and explain why prevalent externalist varieties of representationalism have trouble accommodating it. In light of this, I propose a variety of representati…
The Phenomenal Representation of Size
Suppose that, while you are dreamlessly asleep, the sizes of and distances between all objects in the world are uniformly multiplied. Would you be able to detect this global inflation? Intuitively, no. But would your experience of size remain accurate? Intuitively, yes. On these grounds, some have concluded that our experiences do not represent size and instead represent modes of presentation of size. We are, in this sense, ‘cut off’ from the siz…
No prominent works on this page.
The Phenomenal Representation of Size
Suppose that, while you are dreamlessly asleep, the sizes of and distances between all objects in the world are uniformly multiplied. Would you be able to detect this global inflation? Intuitively, no. But would your experience of size remain accurate? Intuitively, yes. On these grounds, some have concluded that our experiences do not represent size and instead represent modes of presentation of size. We are, in this sense, ‘cut off’ from the siz…
What the Senses Cannot ‘Say’
Some have claimed that there are laws of appearance, i.e. in principle constraints on which types of sensory experiences are possible. Within a representationalist framework, these laws amount to restrictions on what a given experience can represent. I offer an in-depth defence of one such law and explain why prevalent externalist varieties of representationalism have trouble accommodating it. In light of this, I propose a variety of representati…
Epistemology (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Aesthetics (1 work) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Dilemma (1 work) · Direct and indirect realism (1 work)