Julio De Rizzo
Biographic Data
| ID | 5966058 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Julio De Rizzo |
| GIVEN NAMES | Julio |
| FAMILY NAME | De Rizzo |
| SIGNATURE | DE RIZZO J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Vienna |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5879-7310 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 12 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Husserl on Perception
A growing body of scholarship examines whether Husserl’s account of perception should be read as disjunctivist or conjunctivist. Focusing on the Logical Investigations , this paper defends a conciliatory interpretation: Husserl’s view incorporates elements of both. At the level of descriptive psychology, perceptual acts are individuated by their intentional essence—quality and matter—supporting conjunctivism. Yet Husserlian epistemology, centered…
Simpler Representational Ground
A common way of clarifying the notion of ground is by way of examples from logic: thus a conjunction is grounded in both of its conjuncts; a disjunction in each of its true disjuncts; a double negation in its negatum; and so on. Developing a semantics that accommodates these logical examples in full generality turned out to be a difficult task. In this paper, I develop a novel approach that substitutes fusion for a more discerning relation of com…
Introduction to the special issue ‘Truth and Quantification into Sentence Position’
This is the introduction to the Inquiry special issue on Truth and Quantification into Sentence Position. The rationale of the special issue is explained and all contributions are briefly introduced
Modal perspectivalism
There are limits to how things might have been. Yet tiny permissible differences between possibilities add up to large ones that exceed those limits. This tension lies at the heart of the so-called tolerance puzzle . In this paper, I propose a novel response grounded in the idea that metaphysical modality is perspectival. The perspectivalist framework is used to dissolve the puzzle and is contrasted with two alternatives: one that posits a plenit…
Deflationism, explanation and “because”
Two influential objections to deflationism about truth question its ability to explain the role of true beliefs in successful actions; and to account for general compositional principles linking truth to complex sentences governed by truth-functional connectives. In this paper, I address recent formulations of these objections by Will Gamester and Richard Heck. My responses draw on recent work on explanation, grounding, and the logic of “because”…
Grounding
Is the macro grounded in the micro? That is, is every truth about a macroscopic object fully grounded in a truth wholly about its microscopic parts? In a recent interesting paper, Martin Glazier argued for a negative answer. Following him, call the position that the macro is grounded in the micro ‘priority micro pluralism’ (‘pluralism’ for short). In this discussion note, I propose a way out for the pluralist. In brief, it consists in the recogni…
Ingarden on the varieties of dependence
In the third chapter of his major work, the Controversy over the Existence of the World , Roman Ingarden discusses four varieties of dependence entities might exhibit. The aim of this essay is to explore these varieties and to put the claims Ingarden makes concerning them on a rigorous footing
The Indeterminacy of the Distinction between Objects and Ways of Being
Few if any distinctions are more easily recognisable and assented to than that between objects , that is, things which are some ways, and that which they are, that is, ways for objects to be (‘ways of being’ for short). In this paper I present an argument designed to show that this distinction is indeterminate in the sense that the truth-conditions of predicational sentences leave open what should count as an object and a way of being. The bulk o…
Explaining coincidences
A traditional account of coincidences has it that two facts are coincidental whenever they are not related as cause and effect and do not have a common cause. A recent contribution by Lando (Noûs 51(1): 132–151, 2017) showed that this account is mistaken. In this paper, I argue against two alternative accounts of coincidences, one suggested by Lando, and another by Bhogal (Philos Phenomenol Res 100(3): 677–694, 2020), and defend a third one in th…
The Ground of All Negative Existential Truths
A natural proposal for the grounds of negative existential truths, such as that Vulcan does not exist, states that these truths are grounded in the totality truth affirming the existence of every existent thing together with the truth that they are all. In this paper I will put forward three objections to straightforward formulations of this idea, and argue that a change in the usual grammar of grounding claims, allowing for pluralities of senten…
Reasons Why Not
Reasons Why Not
Explaining coincidences
A traditional account of coincidences has it that two facts are coincidental whenever they are not related as cause and effect and do not have a common cause. A recent contribution by Lando (Noûs 51(1): 132–151, 2017) showed that this account is mistaken. In this paper, I argue against two alternative accounts of coincidences, one suggested by Lando, and another by Bhogal (Philos Phenomenol Res 100(3): 677–694, 2020), and defend a third one in th…
Reasons Why Not
Reasons Why Not
The Ground of All Negative Existential Truths
A natural proposal for the grounds of negative existential truths, such as that Vulcan does not exist, states that these truths are grounded in the totality truth affirming the existence of every existent thing together with the truth that they are all. In this paper I will put forward three objections to straightforward formulations of this idea, and argue that a change in the usual grammar of grounding claims, allowing for pluralities of senten…
Explaining coincidences
A traditional account of coincidences has it that two facts are coincidental whenever they are not related as cause and effect and do not have a common cause. A recent contribution by Lando (Noûs 51(1): 132–151, 2017) showed that this account is mistaken. In this paper, I argue against two alternative accounts of coincidences, one suggested by Lando, and another by Bhogal (Philos Phenomenol Res 100(3): 677–694, 2020), and defend a third one in th…
Ingarden on the varieties of dependence
In the third chapter of his major work, the Controversy over the Existence of the World , Roman Ingarden discusses four varieties of dependence entities might exhibit. The aim of this essay is to explore these varieties and to put the claims Ingarden makes concerning them on a rigorous footing
The Indeterminacy of the Distinction between Objects and Ways of Being
Few if any distinctions are more easily recognisable and assented to than that between objects , that is, things which are some ways, and that which they are, that is, ways for objects to be (‘ways of being’ for short). In this paper I present an argument designed to show that this distinction is indeterminate in the sense that the truth-conditions of predicational sentences leave open what should count as an object and a way of being. The bulk o…
Grounding
Is the macro grounded in the micro? That is, is every truth about a macroscopic object fully grounded in a truth wholly about its microscopic parts? In a recent interesting paper, Martin Glazier argued for a negative answer. Following him, call the position that the macro is grounded in the micro ‘priority micro pluralism’ (‘pluralism’ for short). In this discussion note, I propose a way out for the pluralist. In brief, it consists in the recogni…
Husserl on Perception
A growing body of scholarship examines whether Husserl’s account of perception should be read as disjunctivist or conjunctivist. Focusing on the Logical Investigations , this paper defends a conciliatory interpretation: Husserl’s view incorporates elements of both. At the level of descriptive psychology, perceptual acts are individuated by their intentional essence—quality and matter—supporting conjunctivism. Yet Husserlian epistemology, centered…
Simpler Representational Ground
A common way of clarifying the notion of ground is by way of examples from logic: thus a conjunction is grounded in both of its conjuncts; a disjunction in each of its true disjuncts; a double negation in its negatum; and so on. Developing a semantics that accommodates these logical examples in full generality turned out to be a difficult task. In this paper, I develop a novel approach that substitutes fusion for a more discerning relation of com…
Introduction to the special issue ‘Truth and Quantification into Sentence Position’
This is the introduction to the Inquiry special issue on Truth and Quantification into Sentence Position. The rationale of the special issue is explained and all contributions are briefly introduced
Modal perspectivalism
There are limits to how things might have been. Yet tiny permissible differences between possibilities add up to large ones that exceed those limits. This tension lies at the heart of the so-called tolerance puzzle . In this paper, I propose a novel response grounded in the idea that metaphysical modality is perspectival. The perspectivalist framework is used to dissolve the puzzle and is contrasted with two alternatives: one that posits a plenit…
Deflationism, explanation and “because”
Two influential objections to deflationism about truth question its ability to explain the role of true beliefs in successful actions; and to account for general compositional principles linking truth to complex sentences governed by truth-functional connectives. In this paper, I address recent formulations of these objections by Will Gamester and Richard Heck. My responses draw on recent work on explanation, grounding, and the logic of “because”…
Philosophy (9 works) · Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Common ground (2 works)