Lisa Leininger
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 5966069 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Lisa Leininger |
| NOMBRES | Lisa |
| APELLIDO | Leininger |
| FIRMA | LEININGER L |
| AFILIACIONES | Hobart and William Smith Colleges |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 4 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 0 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 4 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2016 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 0 |
Presentism’s persisting problem
David Lewis [1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers] famously declares that presentism is unable to allow for objects to persist and therefore should be rejected. The underlying idea is that presentism, in which only present entities exist, conflicts with persistence, which requires an object exist at multiple times. Both presentists and eternalists alike take this objection to be easily dismissed because the present…
Coordination and Coming to Be
The following are purported to be common-sense features of the world: time’s passage, the unreality of the future, the existence of ‘genuine’ change. All of these common-sense features are accommodated by accepting the phenomenon of absolute becoming, a view of temporal passage in which the unreal future comes into existence in the present. Indeed, most philosophers who lay claim to common-sense views of time accept absolute becoming. I argue tha…
Temporal B-Coming
It is taken as obvious that there is a conflict between objective temporal passage and relativistic physics. The traditional formulation of temporal passage is the movement of a universe-wide set of simultaneous events known as the NOW; the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) implies that there is no NOW and therefore no temporal passage. The vast majority of those who accept the B-theory blockworld—the metaphysics of time most friendly to relativ…
The Structure of the World
Phenomenological common sense tells us that reality is composed of objects: I am lounging on a couch, drinking from a glass, and writing with a pen on a notepad. It does not seem much of a leap to accept that our fundamental ontology is like the world we see; reality, at its foundation, is composed of objects as well. Steven French, in The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, rejects this picture of basic reality. His main clai…
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The Structure of the World
Phenomenological common sense tells us that reality is composed of objects: I am lounging on a couch, drinking from a glass, and writing with a pen on a notepad. It does not seem much of a leap to accept that our fundamental ontology is like the world we see; reality, at its foundation, is composed of objects as well. Steven French, in The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, rejects this picture of basic reality. His main clai…
Temporal B-Coming
It is taken as obvious that there is a conflict between objective temporal passage and relativistic physics. The traditional formulation of temporal passage is the movement of a universe-wide set of simultaneous events known as the NOW; the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) implies that there is no NOW and therefore no temporal passage. The vast majority of those who accept the B-theory blockworld—the metaphysics of time most friendly to relativ…
Coordination and Coming to Be
The following are purported to be common-sense features of the world: time’s passage, the unreality of the future, the existence of ‘genuine’ change. All of these common-sense features are accommodated by accepting the phenomenon of absolute becoming, a view of temporal passage in which the unreal future comes into existence in the present. Indeed, most philosophers who lay claim to common-sense views of time accept absolute becoming. I argue tha…
Presentism’s persisting problem
David Lewis [1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers] famously declares that presentism is unable to allow for objects to persist and therefore should be rejected. The underlying idea is that presentism, in which only present entities exist, conflicts with persistence, which requires an object exist at multiple times. Both presentists and eternalists alike take this objection to be easily dismissed because the present…
Epistemology (4 obras) · Philosophy (4 obras) · Computer Science (2 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Metaphysics (2 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 obras) · Absolute (philosophy) (1 obras) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 obras)