Jean Moritz Müller
Biographic Data
| ID | 5966093 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jean Moritz Müller |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jean Moritz |
| FAMILY NAME | Müller |
| SIGNATURE | MÜLLER J M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Bonn |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7894-654X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The Expressivity and Rationality of Expressive Action
Actions expressive of emotion are widely thought to pose a problem for the view that actions admit of rational explanation. Supposing the standard, instrumentalist view of practical rationality, such actions seem not to admit of practical reasons. In this paper, I assess a distinctive line of response to this problem. As Helm (2001, 2016) and Bennett (2016, 2021) have proposed, we can make sense of expressive actions as rational since they are re…
Motivating reasons: The state of the question
This article surveys the state of the currently burgeoning debate on motivating reasons, which spans across theoretical and practical philosophy. I focus on the metaphysical project at the forefront of this debate, that is, the quest for an account of the nature of motivating reasons, which covers both reasons for which we act as well as reasons for which we hold attitudes. The discussion is organized around two questions at the heart of this pro…
Knowing value and acknowledging value: On the significance of emotional evaluation
It is widely assumed that emotions are evaluative. Moreover, many authors suppose that emotions are important or valuable as evaluations. According to the currently dominant version of cognitivism, emotions are evaluative insofar as they make us aware of value properties of their intentional objects. In attributing to emotions an epistemic role, this view conceives of them as epistemically valuable. In this paper, I argue that proponents of this …
Motivating reasons, responses and the Taking Condition
Many metaethicists endorse a cognitive constraint which links the reasons for which we act or hold attitudes (motivating reasons) to normative reasons (reasons that speak in favour of an action or attitude). As traditionally formulated, this constraint (known as the Taking Condition) requires that an agent’s motivating reasons are mentally represented by her as corresponding normative reasons. In response to the charge that the Taking Condition i…
The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: Affective Intentionality and Position-Taking
This article is a précis of my 2019 monograph The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and Intentionality. The book engages with a growing trend of philosophical thinking according to which the felt dimension and the intentionality of emotion are unified. While sympathetic to the general approach, I argue for a reconceptualization of the form of intentionality that emotional feelings are widely thought to possess and, accordingly, o…
Apprehending Value, Position-Taking and the Manifest Image of Emotion: Responses to Commentators
This article clarifies and defends my view of emotional feeling in response to the commentaries by Ronnie de Sousa, Rick Furtak, Agnes Moors, Kevin Mulligan, Rainer Reisenzein and Philipp Schmidt. The issues addressed concern my critique of the axiological receptivity view, my proposed alternative, i.e. the position-taking view, as well as my methodological commitments
The spontaneity of emotion
It is a commonplace that emotions are characteristically passive. As we ordinarily think of them, emotions are ways in which we are acted upon, that is, moved or affected by aspects of our environment. Moreover, we have no voluntary control over whether we feel them. In this paper, I call attention to a much‐neglected respect in which emotions are active, which is no less central to our pretheoretical concept of them. That is, in having emotions,…
In Defense of the Content-Priority View of Emotion
A prominent version of emotional cognitivism has it that emotions are preceded by awareness of value. Jonathan Mitchell [-@mitchell_jo:2019a] has recently attacked this view (which he calls the content-priority view) on the ground that extant suggestions for the relevant type of pre-emotional evaluative awareness are all problematic. Unless these problems can be overcome, he argues, the view does not represent a plausible competitor to rivalling …
Perceptualism and the epistemology of normative reasons
According to much recent work in metaethics, we have a perceptual access to normative properties and relations. On a common approach, this access has a presentational character. Here, ‘presentational’ specifies a characteristic feature of the way aspects of the environment are apprehended in sensory experience. While many authors have argued that we enjoy presentations of value properties, thus far comparatively less effort has been invested into…
Emotions, Values and Agency
Emotions, Values and Agency provides a skillful defence of the view that emotions constitute a kind of perceptual experience and forges a number of interesting connections between this view and several central debates in metaethics. The author's aim conforms to the current trend to revalorise the emotions as epistemologically and ethically significant. At the same time, the account she puts forward is a nuanced one, which is sensitive to many of …
Response-Dependent Normative Properties and the Epistemic Account of Emotion
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Response-Dependent Normative Properties and the Epistemic Account of Emotion
Emotions, Values and Agency
Emotions, Values and Agency provides a skillful defence of the view that emotions constitute a kind of perceptual experience and forges a number of interesting connections between this view and several central debates in metaethics. The author's aim conforms to the current trend to revalorise the emotions as epistemologically and ethically significant. At the same time, the account she puts forward is a nuanced one, which is sensitive to many of …
The spontaneity of emotion
It is a commonplace that emotions are characteristically passive. As we ordinarily think of them, emotions are ways in which we are acted upon, that is, moved or affected by aspects of our environment. Moreover, we have no voluntary control over whether we feel them. In this paper, I call attention to a much‐neglected respect in which emotions are active, which is no less central to our pretheoretical concept of them. That is, in having emotions,…
In Defense of the Content-Priority View of Emotion
A prominent version of emotional cognitivism has it that emotions are preceded by awareness of value. Jonathan Mitchell [-@mitchell_jo:2019a] has recently attacked this view (which he calls the content-priority view) on the ground that extant suggestions for the relevant type of pre-emotional evaluative awareness are all problematic. Unless these problems can be overcome, he argues, the view does not represent a plausible competitor to rivalling …
Perceptualism and the epistemology of normative reasons
According to much recent work in metaethics, we have a perceptual access to normative properties and relations. On a common approach, this access has a presentational character. Here, ‘presentational’ specifies a characteristic feature of the way aspects of the environment are apprehended in sensory experience. While many authors have argued that we enjoy presentations of value properties, thus far comparatively less effort has been invested into…
The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: Affective Intentionality and Position-Taking
This article is a précis of my 2019 monograph The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and Intentionality. The book engages with a growing trend of philosophical thinking according to which the felt dimension and the intentionality of emotion are unified. While sympathetic to the general approach, I argue for a reconceptualization of the form of intentionality that emotional feelings are widely thought to possess and, accordingly, o…
Apprehending Value, Position-Taking and the Manifest Image of Emotion: Responses to Commentators
This article clarifies and defends my view of emotional feeling in response to the commentaries by Ronnie de Sousa, Rick Furtak, Agnes Moors, Kevin Mulligan, Rainer Reisenzein and Philipp Schmidt. The issues addressed concern my critique of the axiological receptivity view, my proposed alternative, i.e. the position-taking view, as well as my methodological commitments
Motivating reasons, responses and the Taking Condition
Many metaethicists endorse a cognitive constraint which links the reasons for which we act or hold attitudes (motivating reasons) to normative reasons (reasons that speak in favour of an action or attitude). As traditionally formulated, this constraint (known as the Taking Condition) requires that an agent’s motivating reasons are mentally represented by her as corresponding normative reasons. In response to the charge that the Taking Condition i…
Motivating reasons: The state of the question
This article surveys the state of the currently burgeoning debate on motivating reasons, which spans across theoretical and practical philosophy. I focus on the metaphysical project at the forefront of this debate, that is, the quest for an account of the nature of motivating reasons, which covers both reasons for which we act as well as reasons for which we hold attitudes. The discussion is organized around two questions at the heart of this pro…
Knowing value and acknowledging value: On the significance of emotional evaluation
It is widely assumed that emotions are evaluative. Moreover, many authors suppose that emotions are important or valuable as evaluations. According to the currently dominant version of cognitivism, emotions are evaluative insofar as they make us aware of value properties of their intentional objects. In attributing to emotions an epistemic role, this view conceives of them as epistemically valuable. In this paper, I argue that proponents of this …
The Expressivity and Rationality of Expressive Action
Actions expressive of emotion are widely thought to pose a problem for the view that actions admit of rational explanation. Supposing the standard, instrumentalist view of practical rationality, such actions seem not to admit of practical reasons. In this paper, I assess a distinctive line of response to this problem. As Helm (2001, 2016) and Bennett (2016, 2021) have proposed, we can make sense of expressive actions as rational since they are re…
Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Psychology (9 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (8 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (8 works) · Social Psychology (8 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Cognitive psychology (4 works) · Perception (4 works)