Anders Nes
Biographic Data
| ID | 5966434 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Anders Nes |
| GIVEN NAMES | Anders |
| FAMILY NAME | Nes |
| SIGNATURE | NES A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Norwegian University of Science and Technology |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4182-3594 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
(Non-)conceptual representation of meaning in utterance comprehension
Cognitivist, as well as many perceptualist, views of utterance comprehension agree that understanding an utterance involves knowing, believing, perceiving, or, anyhow, mentally representing the utterance to mean such-and-such. I dub such views representationalist. They have been criticised for placing an undue metasemantic demand on utterance comprehension: that speakers be able to represent meaning as meaning. Critics have adverted to young spea…
Why are Actions but not Emotions Done Intentionally, if both are Reason-Responsive Embodied Processes
Emotions, like actions, this paper argues, are typically embodied processes that are responsive to reasons, where these reasons connect closely with the agent’s desires, intentions, or projects. If so, why are emotions, nevertheless, typically passive in a sense in which actions are not; specifically, why are emotions not cases of doing something intentionally? This paper seeks to prepare the ground for answering to this question by showing that …
The perception/cognition distinction
The difference between perception and cognition seems introspectively obvious in many cases. Perceiving and thinking have also been assigned quite different roles, in epistemology, in theories of reference and of mental content, in philosophy of psychology, and elsewhere. Yet what is the nature of the distinction? In what way, or ways, do perception and cognition differ? The paper reviews recent work on these questions. Four main respects in whic…
Perception needs modular stimulus-control
Perceptual processes differ from cognitive, this paper argues, in functioning to be causally controlled by proximal stimuli, and being modular, at least in a modest sense that excludes their being isotropic in Jerry Fodor's sense. This claim agrees with such theorists as Jacob Beck and Ben Phillips that a function of stimulus-control is needed for perceptual status. In support of this necessity claim, I argue, inter alia, that E.J. Green's recent…
Thematic Unity in the Phenomenology of Thinking
Many philosophers hold that the phenomenology of thinking (also known as cognitive phenomenology) reduces to the phenomenology of the speech, sensory imagery, emotions or feelings associated with it. But even if this reductionist claim is correct, there is still a properly cognitive dimension to the phenomenology of at least some thinking. Specifically, conceptual content makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenology of at least some tho…
Perception needs modular stimulus-control
Perceptual processes differ from cognitive, this paper argues, in functioning to be causally controlled by proximal stimuli, and being modular, at least in a modest sense that excludes their being isotropic in Jerry Fodor's sense. This claim agrees with such theorists as Jacob Beck and Ben Phillips that a function of stimulus-control is needed for perceptual status. In support of this necessity claim, I argue, inter alia, that E.J. Green's recent…
Thematic Unity in the Phenomenology of Thinking
Many philosophers hold that the phenomenology of thinking (also known as cognitive phenomenology) reduces to the phenomenology of the speech, sensory imagery, emotions or feelings associated with it. But even if this reductionist claim is correct, there is still a properly cognitive dimension to the phenomenology of at least some thinking. Specifically, conceptual content makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenology of at least some tho…
The perception/cognition distinction
The difference between perception and cognition seems introspectively obvious in many cases. Perceiving and thinking have also been assigned quite different roles, in epistemology, in theories of reference and of mental content, in philosophy of psychology, and elsewhere. Yet what is the nature of the distinction? In what way, or ways, do perception and cognition differ? The paper reviews recent work on these questions. Four main respects in whic…
Perception needs modular stimulus-control
Perceptual processes differ from cognitive, this paper argues, in functioning to be causally controlled by proximal stimuli, and being modular, at least in a modest sense that excludes their being isotropic in Jerry Fodor's sense. This claim agrees with such theorists as Jacob Beck and Ben Phillips that a function of stimulus-control is needed for perceptual status. In support of this necessity claim, I argue, inter alia, that E.J. Green's recent…
Why are Actions but not Emotions Done Intentionally, if both are Reason-Responsive Embodied Processes
Emotions, like actions, this paper argues, are typically embodied processes that are responsive to reasons, where these reasons connect closely with the agent’s desires, intentions, or projects. If so, why are emotions, nevertheless, typically passive in a sense in which actions are not; specifically, why are emotions not cases of doing something intentionally? This paper seeks to prepare the ground for answering to this question by showing that …
(Non-)conceptual representation of meaning in utterance comprehension
Cognitivist, as well as many perceptualist, views of utterance comprehension agree that understanding an utterance involves knowing, believing, perceiving, or, anyhow, mentally representing the utterance to mean such-and-such. I dub such views representationalist. They have been criticised for placing an undue metasemantic demand on utterance comprehension: that speakers be able to represent meaning as meaning. Critics have adverted to young spea…
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Cognitive psychology (4 works) · Cognition (3 works) · Cognitive science (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (2 works) · Linguistics (2 works) · Multisensory perception and integration (2 works)