Alex Moran
Biographic Data
| ID | 5966448 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alex Moran |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alex |
| FAMILY NAME | Moran |
| SIGNATURE | MORAN A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oxford |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9007-9968 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Grounding physicalism and ‘Moorean’ connections
Grounding physicalism is the doctrine that mental properties are metaphysically grounded in underlying physical properties.The present paper develops a novel challenge to this view derived from two main claims: one of them concerning the natures of phenomenal properties, the other concerning the relation between grounding and essence.The central goal of the paper is to explain how grounding physicalists can meet this challenge by means of appeali…
Does Negative Epistemic Disjunctivism Solve the Screening Off Problem
Current orthodoxy in the perception literature is that the only way for disjunctivists to resolve the ‘screening off’ problem they face is to embrace a radical form of disjunctivism known as negative epistemic disjunctivism. What makes the view so radical is its commitment to the claim that the psychological nature of hallucinatory episodes can be characterised wholly in negative epistemic terms: having an hallucinatory experience, according to t…
Primitive colours in a physical world
Colour primitivism is the thesis that the colours are simple qualitative properties of items in the external world—just as they appear to be. This paper considers colour primitivism in relation to a version of Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument. On the one hand, this argument seems to support primitivism, by delivering the conclusion that the colours cannot be reduced to underlying physical features of a sort that Mary might have known about even…
Disjunctivism and the Causal Conditions of Hallucination
Disjunctivists maintain that perceptual experiences and hallucinatory experiences are distinct kinds of event with different metaphysical natures. Moreover, given their view about the nature of perceptual cases, disjunctivists must deny that the perceptual kind of experience can occur during hallucination. However, it is widely held that disjunctivists must grant the converse claim, to the effect that the hallucinatory kind of experience occurs e…
The Mind Body Problem and Metaphysics
Journal Article The Mind Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance Get access The Mind Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance. By Ralph Stefan Weir. (London: Routledge, 2024, 157 pages, Hardback.) Alex Moran Alex Moran Université de Fribourg, Switzerland https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9007-9968 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The…
Grounding physicalism and the knowledge argument
Standard responses to the knowledge argument grant that Mary could know all of the physical facts even while trapped inside her black‐and‐white room. What they deny is that upon leaving her black‐and‐white room and experiencing red for the first time, Mary learns a genuinely new fact. This paper develops an alternate response in a grounding physicalist framework, on which Mary does not know all of the physical facts while trapped inside the room.…
Memory Disjunctivism
Relationalists about episodic memory must endorse a disjunctivist theory of memory-experience according to which cases of genuine memory and cases of total confabulation involve distinct kinds of mental event with different natures. This paper is concerned with a pair of arguments against this view, which are analogues of the ‘causal argument’ and the ‘screening off argument’ that have been pressed in recent literature against relationalist (and …
Living without microphysical supervenience
Grounding physicalism and the knowledge argument
Standard responses to the knowledge argument grant that Mary could know all of the physical facts even while trapped inside her black‐and‐white room. What they deny is that upon leaving her black‐and‐white room and experiencing red for the first time, Mary learns a genuinely new fact. This paper develops an alternate response in a grounding physicalist framework, on which Mary does not know all of the physical facts while trapped inside the room.…
Memory Disjunctivism
Relationalists about episodic memory must endorse a disjunctivist theory of memory-experience according to which cases of genuine memory and cases of total confabulation involve distinct kinds of mental event with different natures. This paper is concerned with a pair of arguments against this view, which are analogues of the ‘causal argument’ and the ‘screening off argument’ that have been pressed in recent literature against relationalist (and …
Living without microphysical supervenience
Grounding physicalism and the knowledge argument
Standard responses to the knowledge argument grant that Mary could know all of the physical facts even while trapped inside her black‐and‐white room. What they deny is that upon leaving her black‐and‐white room and experiencing red for the first time, Mary learns a genuinely new fact. This paper develops an alternate response in a grounding physicalist framework, on which Mary does not know all of the physical facts while trapped inside the room.…
Disjunctivism and the Causal Conditions of Hallucination
Disjunctivists maintain that perceptual experiences and hallucinatory experiences are distinct kinds of event with different metaphysical natures. Moreover, given their view about the nature of perceptual cases, disjunctivists must deny that the perceptual kind of experience can occur during hallucination. However, it is widely held that disjunctivists must grant the converse claim, to the effect that the hallucinatory kind of experience occurs e…
The Mind Body Problem and Metaphysics
Journal Article The Mind Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance Get access The Mind Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance. By Ralph Stefan Weir. (London: Routledge, 2024, 157 pages, Hardback.) Alex Moran Alex Moran Université de Fribourg, Switzerland https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9007-9968 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The…
Primitive colours in a physical world
Colour primitivism is the thesis that the colours are simple qualitative properties of items in the external world—just as they appear to be. This paper considers colour primitivism in relation to a version of Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument. On the one hand, this argument seems to support primitivism, by delivering the conclusion that the colours cannot be reduced to underlying physical features of a sort that Mary might have known about even…
Grounding physicalism and ‘Moorean’ connections
Grounding physicalism is the doctrine that mental properties are metaphysically grounded in underlying physical properties.The present paper develops a novel challenge to this view derived from two main claims: one of them concerning the natures of phenomenal properties, the other concerning the relation between grounding and essence.The central goal of the paper is to explain how grounding physicalists can meet this challenge by means of appeali…
Does Negative Epistemic Disjunctivism Solve the Screening Off Problem
Current orthodoxy in the perception literature is that the only way for disjunctivists to resolve the ‘screening off’ problem they face is to embrace a radical form of disjunctivism known as negative epistemic disjunctivism. What makes the view so radical is its commitment to the claim that the psychological nature of hallucinatory episodes can be characterised wholly in negative epistemic terms: having an hallucinatory experience, according to t…
Metaphysics (8 works) · Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (3 works) · Physicalism (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works)