Oscar A Piedrahita
Biographic Data
| ID | 5966703 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Oscar A Piedrahita |
| GIVEN NAMES | Oscar A |
| FAMILY NAME | Piedrahita |
| SIGNATURE | PIEDRAHITA O A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Johannesburg |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8776-4067 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Modal Luck and Buried Treasure
Modal views of luck, influential in epistemology, hold that luck is characterized by modal fragility. They face a well‐known challenge: Lackey's Buried Treasure cases, which suggest that an event can be both lucky and modally stable. I argue that this challenge assumes that if two events are each modally stable, their conjunction is also modally stable. This assumption fails for conjunctions of independent, contingent events. When component event…
A capacity view of ignorance
I motivate and defend a new account of ignorance for which ignorance is the lack of a suitable explanatory connection between (i) one’s exercise of epistemic abilities and (ii) believing the truth. This view carves out a previously unexplored option space in the ongoing conceptual debate about ignorance in analytic epistemology and is shown to yield better results than competing views of ignorance, including those that define ignorance as a lack …
Pointless facts and the normativity of ignorance
Pointless and unknowable facts suggest that ignorance is more than a mere lack of knowledge or true belief, because ascribing ignorance seems to involve an implicit negative assessment that doesn’t carry over to our ascriptions of agents simply lacking knowledge or true belief. But what exactly is ignorance, aside from a lack of knowledge or true belief? It is tempting to answer by adding a normative condition to ignorance. Accordingly, some auth…
Nudging for judging that p
Recent work in social epistemology has begun to make use of the behavioral-scientific concept of the nudge, but without sustained attention to how it should be translated from behavioral to epistemic contexts. We offer an account of doxastic nudges that satisfies extensional and theoretical desiderata, defend it against other accounts in the literature, and use it to clarify ongoing discussions of how nudges relate to reason-giving, knowledge, an…
Can AI Believe
Lucky Ignorance, Modality and Lack of Knowledge
I argue against the Standard View of ignorance, according to which ignorance is defined as equivalent to lack of knowledge, that cases of environmental epistemic luck, though entailing lack of knowledge, do not necessarily entail ignorance. In support of my argument, I contend that in cases of environmental luck, an agent retains what I call epistemic access to the relevant fact by successfully exercising her epistemic agency and that ignorance a…
Can hinge epistemology close the door on epistemic relativism
"Padilla, J. "Reflexionando acerca de la gramática filosófica
Padilla, Jesús. "Reflexionando acerca de la gramática filosófica", Areté [Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú] 24.2 (2012): 323-349
Can hinge epistemology close the door on epistemic relativism
A capacity view of ignorance
I motivate and defend a new account of ignorance for which ignorance is the lack of a suitable explanatory connection between (i) one’s exercise of epistemic abilities and (ii) believing the truth. This view carves out a previously unexplored option space in the ongoing conceptual debate about ignorance in analytic epistemology and is shown to yield better results than competing views of ignorance, including those that define ignorance as a lack …
"Padilla, J. "Reflexionando acerca de la gramática filosófica
Padilla, Jesús. "Reflexionando acerca de la gramática filosófica", Areté [Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú] 24.2 (2012): 323-349
Lucky Ignorance, Modality and Lack of Knowledge
I argue against the Standard View of ignorance, according to which ignorance is defined as equivalent to lack of knowledge, that cases of environmental epistemic luck, though entailing lack of knowledge, do not necessarily entail ignorance. In support of my argument, I contend that in cases of environmental luck, an agent retains what I call epistemic access to the relevant fact by successfully exercising her epistemic agency and that ignorance a…
Can hinge epistemology close the door on epistemic relativism
Can AI Believe
A capacity view of ignorance
I motivate and defend a new account of ignorance for which ignorance is the lack of a suitable explanatory connection between (i) one’s exercise of epistemic abilities and (ii) believing the truth. This view carves out a previously unexplored option space in the ongoing conceptual debate about ignorance in analytic epistemology and is shown to yield better results than competing views of ignorance, including those that define ignorance as a lack …
Pointless facts and the normativity of ignorance
Pointless and unknowable facts suggest that ignorance is more than a mere lack of knowledge or true belief, because ascribing ignorance seems to involve an implicit negative assessment that doesn’t carry over to our ascriptions of agents simply lacking knowledge or true belief. But what exactly is ignorance, aside from a lack of knowledge or true belief? It is tempting to answer by adding a normative condition to ignorance. Accordingly, some auth…
Nudging for judging that p
Recent work in social epistemology has begun to make use of the behavioral-scientific concept of the nudge, but without sustained attention to how it should be translated from behavioral to epistemic contexts. We offer an account of doxastic nudges that satisfies extensional and theoretical desiderata, defend it against other accounts in the literature, and use it to clarify ongoing discussions of how nudges relate to reason-giving, knowledge, an…
Modal Luck and Buried Treasure
Modal views of luck, influential in epistemology, hold that luck is characterized by modal fragility. They face a well‐known challenge: Lackey's Buried Treasure cases, which suggest that an event can be both lucky and modally stable. I argue that this challenge assumes that if two events are each modally stable, their conjunction is also modally stable. This assumption fails for conjunctions of independent, contingent events. When component event…
Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Ignorance (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works) · Ethics in medical practice (2 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (2 works) · Luck (2 works)