Robert J Hartman
Biographic Data
| ID | 5966736 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Robert J Hartman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Robert J |
| FAMILY NAME | Hartman |
| SIGNATURE | HARTMAN R J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Ohio Northern University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5115-7636 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Moral Luck and the Imperfect Duty to Spare Blame
It is conventional wisdom that appreciating the role of luck in our moral lives should make us more sparing with blame. But views of moral responsibility that allow luck to augment a person’s blameworthiness are in tension with this wisdom. I resolve this tension: our common moral luck partially generates a duty to forgo retributively blaming the blameworthy person at least sometimes. So, although luck can amplify the blame that a person deserves…
From radical evil to constitutive moral luck in Kant’s Religion
The received view is that Kant denies all moral luck. But I show how Kant affirms constitutive moral luck in passages concerning radical evil from Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason . First, I explicate Kant’s claims about radical evil. It is a morally evil disposition that all human beings have necessarily, at least for the first part of their lives, and for which they are blameworthy. Second, since these properties about radical evil…
Moral Responsibility for Consequences
Many philosophers who deny moral luck in consequences also affirm that people can be morally responsible for consequences. But this conjunction of views faces a puzzle: because consequences are almost always shaped by luck, how can people be morally responsible for lucky consequences? The solution to which these philosophers appeal is to distinguish between degree and scope of moral responsibility. Although lucky consequences cannot affect how mu…
A Christian ethics of blame
There is an ethics of blaming the person who deserves blame. The Christian scriptures imply the following no-vengeance condition: a person should not vengefully overtly blame a wrongdoer even if she gives the wrongdoer the exact negative treatment that he deserves. I explicate and defend this novel condition and argue that it demands a revolution in our blaming practices. First, I explain the no-vengeance condition. Second, I argue that the no-ve…
Circumstantial and constitutive moral luck in Kant's moral philosophy
The received view of Kant's moral philosophy is that it precludes all moral luck. But I offer a plausible interpretation according to which Kant embraces moral luck in circumstance and constitution. I interpret the unconditioned nature of transcendental freedom as a person's ability to do the right thing no matter how she is inclined by her circumstantial and constitutive luck. I argue that various passages about degrees of difficulty relating to…
Free will and the moral vice explanation of hell's finality
According to the Free Will Explanation of a traditional view of hell, human freedom explains why some human persons are in hell. Human freedom also explains its punishment and finality: persons in hell have freely developed moral vices that are their own punishment and that make repentance psychologically impossible. So, even though God continues to desire reconciliation with persons in hell, damned persons do not want reconciliation with God. Bu…
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck
Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck
Aspiration
Most people change their values over the course of their lives, and do so via the distinctive kind of agency that Agnes Callard calls ‘aspiration’. For example, Gina, a college student, wonders whether she should take an elective on music appreciation. Currently, she does not value listening to classical music very much. She has, however, caught glimpses of its value such that she is discontented with her current motivations. She hopes that there…
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The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck
Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck
Aspiration
Most people change their values over the course of their lives, and do so via the distinctive kind of agency that Agnes Callard calls ‘aspiration’. For example, Gina, a college student, wonders whether she should take an elective on music appreciation. Currently, she does not value listening to classical music very much. She has, however, caught glimpses of its value such that she is discontented with her current motivations. She hopes that there…
Free will and the moral vice explanation of hell's finality
According to the Free Will Explanation of a traditional view of hell, human freedom explains why some human persons are in hell. Human freedom also explains its punishment and finality: persons in hell have freely developed moral vices that are their own punishment and that make repentance psychologically impossible. So, even though God continues to desire reconciliation with persons in hell, damned persons do not want reconciliation with God. Bu…
Circumstantial and constitutive moral luck in Kant's moral philosophy
The received view of Kant's moral philosophy is that it precludes all moral luck. But I offer a plausible interpretation according to which Kant embraces moral luck in circumstance and constitution. I interpret the unconditioned nature of transcendental freedom as a person's ability to do the right thing no matter how she is inclined by her circumstantial and constitutive luck. I argue that various passages about degrees of difficulty relating to…
Moral Responsibility for Consequences
Many philosophers who deny moral luck in consequences also affirm that people can be morally responsible for consequences. But this conjunction of views faces a puzzle: because consequences are almost always shaped by luck, how can people be morally responsible for lucky consequences? The solution to which these philosophers appeal is to distinguish between degree and scope of moral responsibility. Although lucky consequences cannot affect how mu…
A Christian ethics of blame
There is an ethics of blaming the person who deserves blame. The Christian scriptures imply the following no-vengeance condition: a person should not vengefully overtly blame a wrongdoer even if she gives the wrongdoer the exact negative treatment that he deserves. I explicate and defend this novel condition and argue that it demands a revolution in our blaming practices. First, I explain the no-vengeance condition. Second, I argue that the no-ve…
Moral Luck and the Imperfect Duty to Spare Blame
It is conventional wisdom that appreciating the role of luck in our moral lives should make us more sparing with blame. But views of moral responsibility that allow luck to augment a person’s blameworthiness are in tension with this wisdom. I resolve this tension: our common moral luck partially generates a duty to forgo retributively blaming the blameworthy person at least sometimes. So, although luck can amplify the blame that a person deserves…
From radical evil to constitutive moral luck in Kant’s Religion
The received view is that Kant denies all moral luck. But I show how Kant affirms constitutive moral luck in passages concerning radical evil from Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason . First, I explicate Kant’s claims about radical evil. It is a morally evil disposition that all human beings have necessarily, at least for the first part of their lives, and for which they are blameworthy. Second, since these properties about radical evil…
Free Will and Agency (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (6 works) · Luck (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Social Psychology (4 works) · Blame (3 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (2 works)