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Dan Lloyd

Biographic Data

ID5967486
NAMEDan Lloyd
GIVEN NAMESDan
FAMILY NAMELloyd
SIGNATURELLOYD D
AFFILIATIONSHartford Financial Services (United States)
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS8
TOTAL CITATIONS1
AUTHOR COUNT8
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1987
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX1
  • Centering the narrative: Dennett on the self

    Dan Lloyd, D Ieuan Lloyd•ARTICLE•Philosophical Psychology•2026

    Daniel Dennett’s expansive works repeatedly discuss the nature of the Self. As with his energetic reconstruals of qualia, consciousness, and free will (among others), Dennett debunks the existence of the Self as a reified entity in the brain or mind, or as equivalent to one’s body. Instead, he proposes to understand the self as a “center of narrative gravity” (CNG), an abstract entity. This paper addresses the CNG, working toward a positive accou…

  • Neural correlates of temporality: Default mode variability and temporal awareness

    Open Access•Dan Lloyd•ARTICLE•Consciousness and Cognition•2012

  • Many times over: A brief reply to Lee and Klincewicz

    Open Access•Dan Lloyd•ARTICLE•Consciousness and Cognition•2012

  • Beyond “the Fringe”: A Cautionary Critique of William James

    Open Access•Dan Lloyd•ARTICLE•Consciousness and Cognition•2000

  • Simple Minds

    Jean Kazez, Jean R Kazez et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1994

  • Microcognition

    Dan Lloyd, Andrew Clark et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1992

  • Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind

    Dan Lloyd, Jerry A Fodor•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1991

  • Mental representation from the bottom up

    Open Access•Dan Lloyd•ARTICLE•Synthese•1987•Cited by: 1•References: 60

  • Mental representation from the bottom up

    Open Access•Dan Lloyd•ARTICLE•Synthese•1987•Cited by: 1•References: 60

  • Mental representation from the bottom up

    Open Access•Dan Lloyd•ARTICLE•Synthese•1987•Cited by: 1•References: 60

  • Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind

    Dan Lloyd, Jerry A Fodor•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1991

  • Microcognition

    Dan Lloyd, Andrew Clark et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1992

  • Simple Minds

    Jean Kazez, Jean R Kazez et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1994

  • Beyond “the Fringe”: A Cautionary Critique of William James

    Open Access•Dan Lloyd•ARTICLE•Consciousness and Cognition•2000

  • Neural correlates of temporality: Default mode variability and temporal awareness

    Open Access•Dan Lloyd•ARTICLE•Consciousness and Cognition•2012

  • Many times over: A brief reply to Lee and Klincewicz

    Open Access•Dan Lloyd•ARTICLE•Consciousness and Cognition•2012

  • Centering the narrative: Dennett on the self

    Dan Lloyd, D Ieuan Lloyd•ARTICLE•Philosophical Psychology•2026

    Daniel Dennett’s expansive works repeatedly discuss the nature of the Self. As with his energetic reconstruals of qualia, consciousness, and free will (among others), Dennett debunks the existence of the Self as a reified entity in the brain or mind, or as equivalent to one’s body. Instead, he proposes to understand the self as a “center of narrative gravity” (CNG), an abstract entity. This paper addresses the CNG, working toward a positive accou…

Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Cognitive psychology (3 works) · Cognitive science (3 works) · Neural dynamics and brain function (3 works) · Cognition (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Consciousness (2 works) · Contemporary philosophy (2 works)

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