Olivia Bailey
Biographic Data
| ID | 5967751 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Olivia Bailey |
| GIVEN NAMES | Olivia |
| FAMILY NAME | Bailey |
| SIGNATURE | BAILEY O |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Berkeley |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 9 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The Heart and Its Attitudes
Stephen Darwall has had a change of heart. He remains committed to the Strawsonian analysis of moral accountability and obligation memorably articulated in The Second-Personal Standpoint (2006). Still, The Heart and Its Attitudes reflects the growth of a new conviction: in focusing narrowly on ‘reactive attitudes of the will’ (resentment, guilt, blame) and their contributions to deontic morality, philosophers have failed to properly reckon with t…
Empathy, extremism, and epistemic autonomy
Are extremists (incels, neo-nazis, and the like) characteristically answerable for their moral and political convictions? Is it necessary to offer them reasoned arguments against their views, or is it instead appropriate to bypass that kind of engagement? Discussion of these questions has centered around the putative epistemic autonomy of extremists. The parties to this discussion have assumed that epistemic autonomy is solely (or at least primar…
Empathy and the Value of Humane Understanding
Empathy is a form of emotionally charged imaginative perspective‐taking. It is also the unique source of a particular form of understanding, which I will call humane understanding. Humane understanding consists in the direct apprehension of the intelligibility of others’ emotions. This apprehension is an epistemic good whose ethical significance is multifarious. In this paper, I focus on elaborating the sense in which humane understanding of othe…
What Knowledge Is Necessary for Virtue
Critics contend that Aristotelianism demands too much of the virtuous person in the way of knowledge to be credible. This general charge is usually directed against either of two of Aristotelianism’s apparent claims about the necessary conditions for the possession of a single virtue, namely that (1) one must know what all the other virtues require, and (2) one must also be the master of a preternatural range of technical/empirical knowledge. I a…
Empathy and the Value of Humane Understanding
Empathy is a form of emotionally charged imaginative perspective‐taking. It is also the unique source of a particular form of understanding, which I will call humane understanding. Humane understanding consists in the direct apprehension of the intelligibility of others’ emotions. This apprehension is an epistemic good whose ethical significance is multifarious. In this paper, I focus on elaborating the sense in which humane understanding of othe…
What Knowledge Is Necessary for Virtue
Critics contend that Aristotelianism demands too much of the virtuous person in the way of knowledge to be credible. This general charge is usually directed against either of two of Aristotelianism’s apparent claims about the necessary conditions for the possession of a single virtue, namely that (1) one must know what all the other virtues require, and (2) one must also be the master of a preternatural range of technical/empirical knowledge. I a…
Empathy and the Value of Humane Understanding
Empathy is a form of emotionally charged imaginative perspective‐taking. It is also the unique source of a particular form of understanding, which I will call humane understanding. Humane understanding consists in the direct apprehension of the intelligibility of others’ emotions. This apprehension is an epistemic good whose ethical significance is multifarious. In this paper, I focus on elaborating the sense in which humane understanding of othe…
Empathy, extremism, and epistemic autonomy
Are extremists (incels, neo-nazis, and the like) characteristically answerable for their moral and political convictions? Is it necessary to offer them reasoned arguments against their views, or is it instead appropriate to bypass that kind of engagement? Discussion of these questions has centered around the putative epistemic autonomy of extremists. The parties to this discussion have assumed that epistemic autonomy is solely (or at least primar…
The Heart and Its Attitudes
Stephen Darwall has had a change of heart. He remains committed to the Strawsonian analysis of moral accountability and obligation memorably articulated in The Second-Personal Standpoint (2006). Still, The Heart and Its Attitudes reflects the growth of a new conviction: in focusing narrowly on ‘reactive attitudes of the will’ (resentment, guilt, blame) and their contributions to deontic morality, philosophers have failed to properly reckon with t…
Epistemology (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (2 works) · Empathy (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works) · Virtue (2 works) · Analytic philosophy (1 work)