Geoffrey Lee
Biographic Data
| ID | 5967835 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Geoffrey Lee |
| GIVEN NAMES | Geoffrey |
| FAMILY NAME | Lee |
| SIGNATURE | LEE G |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Berkeley |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9749-6983 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Against Magnitude Realism
In recent work, Christopher Peacocke has argued for a kind of realism (or anti-reductionism) about magnitudes such as temperature and spatial distance. Peacocke’s argument is that magnitudes are an ineliminable commitment of scientific and everyday explanations (including high-level explanations), and that they are the natural candidates for semantic values of our ordinary magnitude talk, and for contents of our mental states. I critique these ar…
Representing Probability in Perception and Experience
Selfless Experience
The Conscious Brain
In his superb book The Conscious Brain, Prinz defends a theory of consciousness: a theory that (among other things) tells us what kind of thing consciousness is, what distinguishes different kinds of conscious states, and how consciousness is implemented in the human brain. Prinz's view is that conscious experiences are attended intermediate-level perceptual representations. Intermediate-level representations are, roughly, the kinds of representa…
Commentary on Dan Lloyd
Consciousness in a Space‐time World 1
Consciousness in a Space‐time World 1
Commentary on Dan Lloyd
The Conscious Brain
In his superb book The Conscious Brain, Prinz defends a theory of consciousness: a theory that (among other things) tells us what kind of thing consciousness is, what distinguishes different kinds of conscious states, and how consciousness is implemented in the human brain. Prinz's view is that conscious experiences are attended intermediate-level perceptual representations. Intermediate-level representations are, roughly, the kinds of representa…
Selfless Experience
Representing Probability in Perception and Experience
Against Magnitude Realism
In recent work, Christopher Peacocke has argued for a kind of realism (or anti-reductionism) about magnitudes such as temperature and spatial distance. Peacocke’s argument is that magnitudes are an ineliminable commitment of scientific and everyday explanations (including high-level explanations), and that they are the natural candidates for semantic values of our ordinary magnitude talk, and for contents of our mental states. I critique these ar…
Philosophy (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Citation (2 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Library science (2 works)