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Sonia Roca-Royes

Biographic Data

ID5968226
NAMESonia Roca-Royes
GIVEN NAMESSonia
FAMILY NAMERoca-Royes
SIGNATUREROCA-ROYES S
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Stirling
ORCID0000-0002-6101-3353
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS7
TOTAL CITATIONS6
WORKS AS AUTHOR7
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2009
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX1
  • Kantian Modality vis-à-vis Neo-Aristotelian Modality

    Open Access•Sonia Roca-Royes•ARTICLE•Inquiry•2026

    The paper discusses Jessica Leech's Modal Transcendentalism. In particular, it engages critically with the claim that her Objective Necessity, of Kantian inspiration, in being the strictest real necessity, earns the title of Metaphysical Necessity. I argue that a Neo-Aristotelian Modality better deserves that title, but that this discussion is ultimately a distraction, with the danger of making us see these two modalities as competitors of one an…

  • Genuine Modal Realism, the Humean thesis and advanced modalizing

    Open Access•Sonia Roca-Royes•ARTICLE•Synthese•2020•Cited by: 1•References: 10

    The paper argues that Lewis’ Genuine Modal Realism, in taking the plurality of worlds to be necessarily the way it is, implies the existence of necessary connections of the sort that contradicts the Humean thesis that Lewis endorses. By endorsing, pace Divers, a non-redundancy interpretation of advanced modalizing, we gain the means to exactly state what these connections amount to

  • Similarity and Possibility

    Open Access•Sonia Roca-Royes•CHAPTER•Modal Epistemology after…•2017

  • Essentialism vis-à-vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism

    Open Access•Sonia Roca‐roye, Sonia Roca-Royes•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2011•References: 9

    Pace Necessitism - roughly, the view that existence is not contingent - essential properties provide necessary conditions for the existence of objects. Sufficiency properties, by contrast, provide sufficient conditions, and individual essences provide necessary and sufficient conditions. This paper explains how these kinds of properties can be used to illuminate the ontological status of merely possible objects and to construct a respectable poss…

  • Teaching & Learning Guide for

    Open Access•Sonia Roca‐roye, Sonia Roca-Royes•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2011

    This guide accompanies the following articles: Sonia Roca-Royes, 'Essentialism vis-à-vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.'Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 54-64. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00363.x. Sonia Roca-Royes, 'Essential Properties and Individual Essences.'Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 65-77. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00364.x.Author's IntroductionIntuitively, George Clooney could lose a finger and he would still be him. Also …

  • Essential Properties and Individual Essences

    Open Access•Sonia Roca‐roye, Sonia Roca-Royes•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2011•Cited by: 4•References: 44

    According toEssentialism, an object's properties divide into those that are essential and those that are accidental. Whilebeing humanis commonly thought to be essential to Socrates,being a philosopherplausibly is not. We can motivate the distinction by appealing - as we just did - to examples. However, it is not obvious how best to characterize the notion ofessential property, nor is it easy to give conclusive arguments for the essentiality of a …

  • How Things Might Have Been

    Sonia Roca-Royes•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2009•Cited by: 1•References: 3

    Book Review| April 01 2009 How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties Penelope Mackie, How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon, 2006. xii + 212 pp. Sonia Roca-Royes Sonia Roca-Royes Logos—Logic, Language, and Cognition Research Group Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 266–269. https://doi.org/10.1215/0…

  • Essential Properties and Individual Essences

    Open Access•Sonia Roca‐roye, Sonia Roca-Royes•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2011•Cited by: 4•References: 44

    According toEssentialism, an object's properties divide into those that are essential and those that are accidental. Whilebeing humanis commonly thought to be essential to Socrates,being a philosopherplausibly is not. We can motivate the distinction by appealing - as we just did - to examples. However, it is not obvious how best to characterize the notion ofessential property, nor is it easy to give conclusive arguments for the essentiality of a …

  • Genuine Modal Realism, the Humean thesis and advanced modalizing

    Open Access•Sonia Roca-Royes•ARTICLE•Synthese•2020•Cited by: 1•References: 10

    The paper argues that Lewis’ Genuine Modal Realism, in taking the plurality of worlds to be necessarily the way it is, implies the existence of necessary connections of the sort that contradicts the Humean thesis that Lewis endorses. By endorsing, pace Divers, a non-redundancy interpretation of advanced modalizing, we gain the means to exactly state what these connections amount to

  • How Things Might Have Been

    Sonia Roca-Royes•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2009•Cited by: 1•References: 3

    Book Review| April 01 2009 How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties Penelope Mackie, How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon, 2006. xii + 212 pp. Sonia Roca-Royes Sonia Roca-Royes Logos—Logic, Language, and Cognition Research Group Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 266–269. https://doi.org/10.1215/0…

  • How Things Might Have Been

    Sonia Roca-Royes•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2009•Cited by: 1•References: 3

    Book Review| April 01 2009 How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties Penelope Mackie, How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon, 2006. xii + 212 pp. Sonia Roca-Royes Sonia Roca-Royes Logos—Logic, Language, and Cognition Research Group Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 266–269. https://doi.org/10.1215/0…

  • Essentialism vis-à-vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism

    Open Access•Sonia Roca‐roye, Sonia Roca-Royes•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2011•References: 9

    Pace Necessitism - roughly, the view that existence is not contingent - essential properties provide necessary conditions for the existence of objects. Sufficiency properties, by contrast, provide sufficient conditions, and individual essences provide necessary and sufficient conditions. This paper explains how these kinds of properties can be used to illuminate the ontological status of merely possible objects and to construct a respectable poss…

  • Teaching & Learning Guide for

    Open Access•Sonia Roca‐roye, Sonia Roca-Royes•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2011

    This guide accompanies the following articles: Sonia Roca-Royes, 'Essentialism vis-à-vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.'Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 54-64. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00363.x. Sonia Roca-Royes, 'Essential Properties and Individual Essences.'Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 65-77. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00364.x.Author's IntroductionIntuitively, George Clooney could lose a finger and he would still be him. Also …

  • Essential Properties and Individual Essences

    Open Access•Sonia Roca‐roye, Sonia Roca-Royes•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2011•Cited by: 4•References: 44

    According toEssentialism, an object's properties divide into those that are essential and those that are accidental. Whilebeing humanis commonly thought to be essential to Socrates,being a philosopherplausibly is not. We can motivate the distinction by appealing - as we just did - to examples. However, it is not obvious how best to characterize the notion ofessential property, nor is it easy to give conclusive arguments for the essentiality of a …

  • Similarity and Possibility

    Open Access•Sonia Roca-Royes•CHAPTER•Modal Epistemology after…•2017

  • Genuine Modal Realism, the Humean thesis and advanced modalizing

    Open Access•Sonia Roca-Royes•ARTICLE•Synthese•2020•Cited by: 1•References: 10

    The paper argues that Lewis’ Genuine Modal Realism, in taking the plurality of worlds to be necessarily the way it is, implies the existence of necessary connections of the sort that contradicts the Humean thesis that Lewis endorses. By endorsing, pace Divers, a non-redundancy interpretation of advanced modalizing, we gain the means to exactly state what these connections amount to

  • Kantian Modality vis-à-vis Neo-Aristotelian Modality

    Open Access•Sonia Roca-Royes•ARTICLE•Inquiry•2026

    The paper discusses Jessica Leech's Modal Transcendentalism. In particular, it engages critically with the claim that her Objective Necessity, of Kantian inspiration, in being the strictest real necessity, earns the title of Metaphysical Necessity. I argue that a Neo-Aristotelian Modality better deserves that title, but that this discussion is ultimately a distraction, with the danger of making us see these two modalities as competitors of one an…

Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Essentialism (4 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (3 works) · Physics (3 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works)

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