Jack Woods
Biographic Data
| ID | 5968655 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jack Woods |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jack |
| FAMILY NAME | Woods |
| SIGNATURE | WOODS J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Leeds |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3279-7726 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 15 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Handling rejection
The Semantic Conception of Logic
This collection of new essays presents cutting-edge research on the semantic conception of logic, the invariance criteria of logicality, grammaticality, and logical truth. Contributors explore the history of the semantic tradition, starting with Tarski, and its historical applications, while central criticisms of the tradition, and especially the use of invariance criteria to explain logicality, are revisited by the original participants in that …
Semantic Conception of Logic
The Game of Belief
It is plausible that there is a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also plausible that there is a range of practical reasons bearing on belief. These theses are often thought to be in tension with each other. To resolve the tension, the authors draw on an analogy with a similar distinction between types of reasons for actions in the context of activities. This motivates a two-level account of the structure of normat…
The Authority of Formality
Etiquette and other merely formal normative standards like legality, honor, and rules of games are taken less seriously than they should be. While these standards are not intrinsically reason-providing (or “substantive”) in the way morality is often taken to be, they also play an important role in our practical lives: we collectively treat them as important for assessing the behavior of ourselves and others and as licensing particular forms of sa…
Model Theory, Hume's Dictum, and the Priority of Ethical Theory
It is regrettably common for theorists to attempt to characterize the Humean dictum that one can't get an 'ought' from an 'is' just in broadly logical terms. We here address an important new class of such approaches which appeal to model-theoretic machinery. Our complaint about these recent attempts is that they interfere with substantive debates about the nature of the ethical. This problem, developed in detail for Daniel Singer's and Gillian Ru…
Assertion, denial, content, and (logical) form
The Game of Belief
It is plausible that there is a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also plausible that there is a range of practical reasons bearing on belief. These theses are often thought to be in tension with each other. To resolve the tension, the authors draw on an analogy with a similar distinction between types of reasons for actions in the context of activities. This motivates a two-level account of the structure of normat…
The Authority of Formality
Etiquette and other merely formal normative standards like legality, honor, and rules of games are taken less seriously than they should be. While these standards are not intrinsically reason-providing (or “substantive”) in the way morality is often taken to be, they also play an important role in our practical lives: we collectively treat them as important for assessing the behavior of ourselves and others and as licensing particular forms of sa…
Model Theory, Hume's Dictum, and the Priority of Ethical Theory
It is regrettably common for theorists to attempt to characterize the Humean dictum that one can't get an 'ought' from an 'is' just in broadly logical terms. We here address an important new class of such approaches which appeal to model-theoretic machinery. Our complaint about these recent attempts is that they interfere with substantive debates about the nature of the ethical. This problem, developed in detail for Daniel Singer's and Gillian Ru…
Assertion, denial, content, and (logical) form
Model Theory, Hume's Dictum, and the Priority of Ethical Theory
It is regrettably common for theorists to attempt to characterize the Humean dictum that one can't get an 'ought' from an 'is' just in broadly logical terms. We here address an important new class of such approaches which appeal to model-theoretic machinery. Our complaint about these recent attempts is that they interfere with substantive debates about the nature of the ethical. This problem, developed in detail for Daniel Singer's and Gillian Ru…
The Authority of Formality
Etiquette and other merely formal normative standards like legality, honor, and rules of games are taken less seriously than they should be. While these standards are not intrinsically reason-providing (or “substantive”) in the way morality is often taken to be, they also play an important role in our practical lives: we collectively treat them as important for assessing the behavior of ourselves and others and as licensing particular forms of sa…
The Game of Belief
It is plausible that there is a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also plausible that there is a range of practical reasons bearing on belief. These theses are often thought to be in tension with each other. To resolve the tension, the authors draw on an analogy with a similar distinction between types of reasons for actions in the context of activities. This motivates a two-level account of the structure of normat…
The Semantic Conception of Logic
This collection of new essays presents cutting-edge research on the semantic conception of logic, the invariance criteria of logicality, grammaticality, and logical truth. Contributors explore the history of the semantic tradition, starting with Tarski, and its historical applications, while central criticisms of the tradition, and especially the use of invariance criteria to explain logicality, are revisited by the original participants in that …
Semantic Conception of Logic
Handling rejection
Epistemology (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works)