Benj Hellie
Biographic Data
| ID | 5968804 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Benj Hellie |
| GIVEN NAMES | Benj |
| FAMILY NAME | Hellie |
| SIGNATURE | HELLIE B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Toronto |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5817-3022 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Relativized metaphysical modality
A familiar and useful representation of modality invokes a space of possible worlds, and quantification over it: necessity and possibility are represented, respectively, with universal and existential quantification—so that necessity is truth at all possible worlds; possibility, truth at some. While modality comes in many varieties, a familiar thought gives a singular position to metaphysical modality, as the broadest objective variety, pertainin…
Factive Phenomenal Characters
There's Something It's Like' and the Structure of Consciousness
For an experience to be phenomenally conscious is for there to be something it’s like; our talk about phenomenal consciousness accordingly is permeated by the expression ‘there’s something it’s like’. It would be natural for the linguistically inclined philosopher to react to this situation by trying to advance investigations into the nature of phenomenal consciousness by determining what we mean by that expression: after all, if discourse about …
Factive Phenomenal Characters
There's Something It's Like' and the Structure of Consciousness
For an experience to be phenomenally conscious is for there to be something it’s like; our talk about phenomenal consciousness accordingly is permeated by the expression ‘there’s something it’s like’. It would be natural for the linguistically inclined philosopher to react to this situation by trying to advance investigations into the nature of phenomenal consciousness by determining what we mean by that expression: after all, if discourse about …
Factive Phenomenal Characters
There's Something It's Like' and the Structure of Consciousness
For an experience to be phenomenally conscious is for there to be something it’s like; our talk about phenomenal consciousness accordingly is permeated by the expression ‘there’s something it’s like’. It would be natural for the linguistically inclined philosopher to react to this situation by trying to advance investigations into the nature of phenomenal consciousness by determining what we mean by that expression: after all, if discourse about …
Relativized metaphysical modality
A familiar and useful representation of modality invokes a space of possible worlds, and quantification over it: necessity and possibility are represented, respectively, with universal and existential quantification—so that necessity is truth at all possible worlds; possibility, truth at some. While modality comes in many varieties, a familiar thought gives a singular position to metaphysical modality, as the broadest objective variety, pertainin…
Computer Science (3 works) · Citation (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (1 work) · Consciousness (1 work) · Download (1 work)