Marcello Di Bello
Biographic Data
| ID | 5969033 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Marcello Di Bello |
| GIVEN NAMES | Marcello |
| FAMILY NAME | Di Bello |
| SIGNATURE | DI BELLO M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Arizona State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8684-8827 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Informational richness and its impact on algorithmic fairness
When statistical evidence is not specific enough
Profile Evidence, Fairness, and the Risks of Mistaken Convictions
Many oppose the use of profile evidence against defendants at trial, even when the statistical correlations are reliable and the jury is free from prejudice. The literature has struggled to justify this opposition. We argue that admitting profile evidence is objectionable because it violates what we call “equal protection”—that is, a right of innocent defendants not to be exposed to higher ex ante risks of mistaken conviction compared to other in…
Plausibility and probability in juridical proof
This note discusses three issues that Allen and Pardo believe to be especially problematic for a probabilistic interpretation of standards of proof: (1) the subjectivity of probability assignments; (2) the conjunction paradox; and (3) the non-comparative nature of probabilistic standards. I offer a reading of probabilistic standards that avoids these criticisms
Epistemic closure, assumptions and topics of inquiry
Plausibility and probability in juridical proof
This note discusses three issues that Allen and Pardo believe to be especially problematic for a probabilistic interpretation of standards of proof: (1) the subjectivity of probability assignments; (2) the conjunction paradox; and (3) the non-comparative nature of probabilistic standards. I offer a reading of probabilistic standards that avoids these criticisms
When statistical evidence is not specific enough
Epistemic closure, assumptions and topics of inquiry
Plausibility and probability in juridical proof
This note discusses three issues that Allen and Pardo believe to be especially problematic for a probabilistic interpretation of standards of proof: (1) the subjectivity of probability assignments; (2) the conjunction paradox; and (3) the non-comparative nature of probabilistic standards. I offer a reading of probabilistic standards that avoids these criticisms
Profile Evidence, Fairness, and the Risks of Mistaken Convictions
Many oppose the use of profile evidence against defendants at trial, even when the statistical correlations are reliable and the jury is free from prejudice. The literature has struggled to justify this opposition. We argue that admitting profile evidence is objectionable because it violates what we call “equal protection”—that is, a right of innocent defendants not to be exposed to higher ex ante risks of mistaken conviction compared to other in…
When statistical evidence is not specific enough
Informational richness and its impact on algorithmic fairness
Epistemology (4 works) · Econometrics (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Conviction (2 works)