Samuel Z Elgin
Biographic Data
| ID | 5969035 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Samuel Z Elgin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Samuel Z |
| FAMILY NAME | Elgin |
| SIGNATURE | ELGIN S Z |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California San Diego |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0197-7855 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Unstructured Purity
Purity is the principle that fundamental facts only have fundamental constituents. In recent years, it has played a significant (if sometimes implicit) role in metaphysical theorizing. A philosopher will argue that a fact contains a derivative entity and cite Purity as a reason to deny that is fundamental. I argue that recent developments in higher order logic reveal a subtle ambiguity regarding the interpretation of Purity; there are stronger an…
Haeccities and the triviality of the identity of indiscernibles
The Identity of Indiscernibles is the principle that objects cannot differ only numerically. It is widely held that one interpretation of this principle is trivially true: the claim that objects that bear all of the same properties are identical. This triviality ostensibly arises from haecceities (properties like is identical to a ). I argue that this is not the case; we do not trivialize the Identity of Indiscernibles with haecceities, because i…
Definition by proxy
I take some initial steps toward a theory of real definition, drawing upon recent developments in higher-order logic. The resulting account allows for extremely fine-grained distinctions (it can distinguish between any relata that differ in their syntactic structure, while avoiding the Russell-Myhill problem). It is the first account that can consistently embrace three desirable logical principles that initially appear to be incompatible: the Ide…
Indiscernibility and the grounds of identity
I provide a theory of the metaphysical foundations of identity: an account of what grounds facts of the form $$a=b$$ a = b . In particular, I defend the claim that indiscernibility grounds identity. This is typically rejected because it is viciously circular; plausible assumptions about the logic of ground entail that the fact that $$a=b$$ a = b partially grounds itself. The theory I defend is immune to this circularity
Physicalism and the Identity of Identity Theories
Definition
This paper presents a puzzle about the logic of real definition. I demonstrate that five principles concerning definition—that it is coextensional and irreflexive, that it applies to its cases, that it permits expansion, and that it is itself defined—are logically incompatible. I then explore the advantages and disadvantages of each principle—one of which must be rejected to restore consistency
Merely partial definition and the analysis of knowledge
Knowledge is closed under analytic content
I am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true and that q is an analytic part of p , then S knows that q . After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the prefac…
On question-begging and analytic content
On question-begging and analytic content
Merely partial definition and the analysis of knowledge
Knowledge is closed under analytic content
I am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true and that q is an analytic part of p , then S knows that q . After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the prefac…
On question-begging and analytic content
Merely partial definition and the analysis of knowledge
Knowledge is closed under analytic content
I am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true and that q is an analytic part of p , then S knows that q . After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the prefac…
Physicalism and the Identity of Identity Theories
Definition
This paper presents a puzzle about the logic of real definition. I demonstrate that five principles concerning definition—that it is coextensional and irreflexive, that it applies to its cases, that it permits expansion, and that it is itself defined—are logically incompatible. I then explore the advantages and disadvantages of each principle—one of which must be rejected to restore consistency
Indiscernibility and the grounds of identity
I provide a theory of the metaphysical foundations of identity: an account of what grounds facts of the form $$a=b$$ a = b . In particular, I defend the claim that indiscernibility grounds identity. This is typically rejected because it is viciously circular; plausible assumptions about the logic of ground entail that the fact that $$a=b$$ a = b partially grounds itself. The theory I defend is immune to this circularity
Haeccities and the triviality of the identity of indiscernibles
The Identity of Indiscernibles is the principle that objects cannot differ only numerically. It is widely held that one interpretation of this principle is trivially true: the claim that objects that bear all of the same properties are identical. This triviality ostensibly arises from haecceities (properties like is identical to a ). I argue that this is not the case; we do not trivialize the Identity of Indiscernibles with haecceities, because i…
Definition by proxy
I take some initial steps toward a theory of real definition, drawing upon recent developments in higher-order logic. The resulting account allows for extremely fine-grained distinctions (it can distinguish between any relata that differ in their syntactic structure, while avoiding the Russell-Myhill problem). It is the first account that can consistently embrace three desirable logical principles that initially appear to be incompatible: the Ide…
Unstructured Purity
Purity is the principle that fundamental facts only have fundamental constituents. In recent years, it has played a significant (if sometimes implicit) role in metaphysical theorizing. A philosopher will argue that a fact contains a derivative entity and cite Purity as a reason to deny that is fundamental. I argue that recent developments in higher order logic reveal a subtle ambiguity regarding the interpretation of Purity; there are stronger an…
Metaphysics (9 works) · Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Philosophy of language (7 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Philosophy of science (5 works) · Aesthetics (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works)