Philippe Verreault-Julien
Biographic Data
| ID | 5969062 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Philippe Verreault-Julien |
| GIVEN NAMES | Philippe |
| FAMILY NAME | Verreault-Julien |
| SIGNATURE | VERREAULT-JULIEN P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Eindhoven University of Technology |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5816-8947 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 26 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Understanding and how-possibly explanations
In the current debate on the relation between how-possibly explanations (HPEs) and understanding, two seemingly irreconcilable positions have emerged, which either deny or assert HPEs’ contribution to understanding. We argue, in contrast, that there is substantial room for reconciliation between these positions. First, we show that a shared assumption is unfounded: HPEs can be interpreted as being correct explanations. Second, we argue that what …
Toy models, dispositions, and the power to explain
Two recent contributions have discussed, and disagreed, over whether so-called toy models that attempt to represent dispositions have the power to explain. In this paper, I argue that neither of these positions is completely correct. Toy models may accurately represent, satisfy the veridicality condition, yet fail to provide how-actually explanations. This is because some dispositions remain unmanifested. Instead, the models provide how-possibly …
Hamilton's rule
The explanatory power of Hamilton's rule, the main explanatory principle of social evolution theory, is an ongoing subject of controversy. In this paper, we reinforce the case for the considerable value of the regression-based version of the rule in explaining the evolution of social traits. Although we agree that the rule can have an organizing role in social evolution research, we maintain that it does not explain in virtue of citing causes or …
Representing Non-actual Targets
Models typically have actual, existing targets. However, some models are viewed as having non -actual targets. I argue that this interpretation comes at various costs and propose an alternative that fares better along two dimensions: (1) agreement with practice and (2) ontological and epistemological parsimony. My proposal is that many of these models actually have actual targets
Factive inferentialism and the puzzle of model-based explanation
Highly idealized models may serve various epistemic functions, notably explanation, in virtue of representing the world. Inferentialism provides a prima facie compelling characterization of what constitutes the representation relation. In this paper, I argue that what I call factive inferentialism does not provide a satisfactory solution to the puzzle of model-based—factive—explanation. In particular, I show that making explanatory counterfactual…
How could models possibly provide how-possibly explanations
How could models possibly provide how-possibly explanations
Representing Non-actual Targets
Models typically have actual, existing targets. However, some models are viewed as having non -actual targets. I argue that this interpretation comes at various costs and propose an alternative that fares better along two dimensions: (1) agreement with practice and (2) ontological and epistemological parsimony. My proposal is that many of these models actually have actual targets
Toy models, dispositions, and the power to explain
Two recent contributions have discussed, and disagreed, over whether so-called toy models that attempt to represent dispositions have the power to explain. In this paper, I argue that neither of these positions is completely correct. Toy models may accurately represent, satisfy the veridicality condition, yet fail to provide how-actually explanations. This is because some dispositions remain unmanifested. Instead, the models provide how-possibly …
Hamilton's rule
The explanatory power of Hamilton's rule, the main explanatory principle of social evolution theory, is an ongoing subject of controversy. In this paper, we reinforce the case for the considerable value of the regression-based version of the rule in explaining the evolution of social traits. Although we agree that the rule can have an organizing role in social evolution research, we maintain that it does not explain in virtue of citing causes or …
Factive inferentialism and the puzzle of model-based explanation
Highly idealized models may serve various epistemic functions, notably explanation, in virtue of representing the world. Inferentialism provides a prima facie compelling characterization of what constitutes the representation relation. In this paper, I argue that what I call factive inferentialism does not provide a satisfactory solution to the puzzle of model-based—factive—explanation. In particular, I show that making explanatory counterfactual…
How could models possibly provide how-possibly explanations
Factive inferentialism and the puzzle of model-based explanation
Highly idealized models may serve various epistemic functions, notably explanation, in virtue of representing the world. Inferentialism provides a prima facie compelling characterization of what constitutes the representation relation. In this paper, I argue that what I call factive inferentialism does not provide a satisfactory solution to the puzzle of model-based—factive—explanation. In particular, I show that making explanatory counterfactual…
Hamilton's rule
The explanatory power of Hamilton's rule, the main explanatory principle of social evolution theory, is an ongoing subject of controversy. In this paper, we reinforce the case for the considerable value of the regression-based version of the rule in explaining the evolution of social traits. Although we agree that the rule can have an organizing role in social evolution research, we maintain that it does not explain in virtue of citing causes or …
Representing Non-actual Targets
Models typically have actual, existing targets. However, some models are viewed as having non -actual targets. I argue that this interpretation comes at various costs and propose an alternative that fares better along two dimensions: (1) agreement with practice and (2) ontological and epistemological parsimony. My proposal is that many of these models actually have actual targets
Toy models, dispositions, and the power to explain
Two recent contributions have discussed, and disagreed, over whether so-called toy models that attempt to represent dispositions have the power to explain. In this paper, I argue that neither of these positions is completely correct. Toy models may accurately represent, satisfy the veridicality condition, yet fail to provide how-actually explanations. This is because some dispositions remain unmanifested. Instead, the models provide how-possibly …
Understanding and how-possibly explanations
In the current debate on the relation between how-possibly explanations (HPEs) and understanding, two seemingly irreconcilable positions have emerged, which either deny or assert HPEs’ contribution to understanding. We argue, in contrast, that there is substantial room for reconciliation between these positions. First, we show that a shared assumption is unfounded: HPEs can be interpreted as being correct explanations. Second, we argue that what …
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (6 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Counterfactual thinking (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy of science (2 works)