Daniel Kostić
Biographic Data
| ID | 5969207 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel Kostić |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel |
| FAMILY NAME | Kostić |
| SIGNATURE | KOSTIĆ Đ |
| AFFILIATIONS | Radboud University Nijmegen |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5729-1476 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 22 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Non-causal Explanations of Social and Biological Networks
One argument that all explanations are causal explanations is that no extant analysis of non-causal explanations can respect mandatory restrictions on explanation. After articulating two such restrictions, Asymmetry and Directionality, we consider how they work with respect to an explanation from network theory that applies to both social and brain networks. We argue that there are two viable ways to make sense of this explanation. One approach i…
Does functional connectivity explain
Many successful explanations show how causally individuated parts are responsible for the occurrence of the phenomena that scientists seek to explain. On this view, parts that are chosen only by convention, and related only through correlations, cannot possibly figure in successful explanations. This is because without some form of causal grounding, it seems unintelligible why any explanatory relation between these parts and the phenomenon of int…
Individual and gender inequality in computer science
Inequality prevails in science. Individual inequality means that most perish quickly and only a few are successful, and gender inequality implies that there are differences in achievements for women and men. Using large-scale bibliographic data and following a computational approach, we study the evolution of individual and gender inequality for cohorts from 1970 to 2000 in the whole field of computer science as it grows and becomes a team-based …
On the Role of Erotetic Constraints in Noncausal Explanations
In noncausal explanations, some noncausal facts (such as mathematical, modal, or metaphysical) are used to explain some physical facts. However, precisely because these explanations abstract away from causal facts, they face two challenges: (1) it is not clear why one rather than the other noncausal explanantia would be relevant for the explanandum ; and (2) why would standing in a particular explanatory relation (e.g., “counterfactual dependence…
Mapping explanatory language in neuroscience
The philosophical literature on scientific explanation in neuroscience has been dominated by the idea of mechanisms. The mechanist philosophers often claim that neuroscience is in the business of finding mechanisms. This view has been challenged in numerous ways by showing that there are other successful and widespread explanatory strategies in neuroscience. However, the empirical evidence for all these claims was hitherto lacking. Empirical evid…
Decoupling Topological Explanations from Mechanisms
We provide three innovations to recent debates about whether topological or “network” explanations are a species of mechanistic explanation. First, we more precisely characterize the requirement that all topological explanations are mechanistic explanations and show scientific practice to belie such a requirement. Second, we provide an account that unifies mechanistic and non-mechanistic topological explanations, thereby enriching both the mechan…
The directionality of topological explanations
Proponents of ontic conceptions of explanation require all explanations to be backed by causal, constitutive, or similar relations. Among their justifications is that only ontic conceptions can do justice to the ‘directionality’ of explanation, i.e., the requirement that if X explains Y , then not-Y does not explain not-X . Using topological explanations as an illustration, we argue that non-ontic conceptions of explanation have ample resources f…
Mechanistic and topological explanations
The topological realization
The topological realization
The directionality of topological explanations
Proponents of ontic conceptions of explanation require all explanations to be backed by causal, constitutive, or similar relations. Among their justifications is that only ontic conceptions can do justice to the ‘directionality’ of explanation, i.e., the requirement that if X explains Y , then not-Y does not explain not-X . Using topological explanations as an illustration, we argue that non-ontic conceptions of explanation have ample resources f…
Decoupling Topological Explanations from Mechanisms
We provide three innovations to recent debates about whether topological or “network” explanations are a species of mechanistic explanation. First, we more precisely characterize the requirement that all topological explanations are mechanistic explanations and show scientific practice to belie such a requirement. Second, we provide an account that unifies mechanistic and non-mechanistic topological explanations, thereby enriching both the mechan…
Mechanistic and topological explanations
On the Role of Erotetic Constraints in Noncausal Explanations
In noncausal explanations, some noncausal facts (such as mathematical, modal, or metaphysical) are used to explain some physical facts. However, precisely because these explanations abstract away from causal facts, they face two challenges: (1) it is not clear why one rather than the other noncausal explanantia would be relevant for the explanandum ; and (2) why would standing in a particular explanatory relation (e.g., “counterfactual dependence…
Mapping explanatory language in neuroscience
The philosophical literature on scientific explanation in neuroscience has been dominated by the idea of mechanisms. The mechanist philosophers often claim that neuroscience is in the business of finding mechanisms. This view has been challenged in numerous ways by showing that there are other successful and widespread explanatory strategies in neuroscience. However, the empirical evidence for all these claims was hitherto lacking. Empirical evid…
Mechanistic and topological explanations
The topological realization
The directionality of topological explanations
Proponents of ontic conceptions of explanation require all explanations to be backed by causal, constitutive, or similar relations. Among their justifications is that only ontic conceptions can do justice to the ‘directionality’ of explanation, i.e., the requirement that if X explains Y , then not-Y does not explain not-X . Using topological explanations as an illustration, we argue that non-ontic conceptions of explanation have ample resources f…
Mapping explanatory language in neuroscience
The philosophical literature on scientific explanation in neuroscience has been dominated by the idea of mechanisms. The mechanist philosophers often claim that neuroscience is in the business of finding mechanisms. This view has been challenged in numerous ways by showing that there are other successful and widespread explanatory strategies in neuroscience. However, the empirical evidence for all these claims was hitherto lacking. Empirical evid…
Decoupling Topological Explanations from Mechanisms
We provide three innovations to recent debates about whether topological or “network” explanations are a species of mechanistic explanation. First, we more precisely characterize the requirement that all topological explanations are mechanistic explanations and show scientific practice to belie such a requirement. Second, we provide an account that unifies mechanistic and non-mechanistic topological explanations, thereby enriching both the mechan…
Individual and gender inequality in computer science
Inequality prevails in science. Individual inequality means that most perish quickly and only a few are successful, and gender inequality implies that there are differences in achievements for women and men. Using large-scale bibliographic data and following a computational approach, we study the evolution of individual and gender inequality for cohorts from 1970 to 2000 in the whole field of computer science as it grows and becomes a team-based …
On the Role of Erotetic Constraints in Noncausal Explanations
In noncausal explanations, some noncausal facts (such as mathematical, modal, or metaphysical) are used to explain some physical facts. However, precisely because these explanations abstract away from causal facts, they face two challenges: (1) it is not clear why one rather than the other noncausal explanantia would be relevant for the explanandum ; and (2) why would standing in a particular explanatory relation (e.g., “counterfactual dependence…
Does functional connectivity explain
Many successful explanations show how causally individuated parts are responsible for the occurrence of the phenomena that scientists seek to explain. On this view, parts that are chosen only by convention, and related only through correlations, cannot possibly figure in successful explanations. This is because without some form of causal grounding, it seems unintelligible why any explanatory relation between these parts and the phenomenon of int…
Non-causal Explanations of Social and Biological Networks
One argument that all explanations are causal explanations is that no extant analysis of non-causal explanations can respect mandatory restrictions on explanation. After articulating two such restrictions, Asymmetry and Directionality, we consider how they work with respect to an explanation from network theory that applies to both social and brain networks. We argue that there are two viable ways to make sense of this explanation. One approach i…
Philosophy and History of Science (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Metaphysics (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Philosophy of language (5 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works) · Relation (database) (4 works) · Bioinformatics and Genomic Networks (3 works)