Nicholas Emmerson
Biographic Data
| ID | 5969233 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nicholas Emmerson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nicholas |
| FAMILY NAME | Emmerson |
| SIGNATURE | EMMERSON N |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Birmingham |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4086-6330 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Scientific Progress, Astrobiology and the Pursuit of Knowledge
In this paper, I argue that the fact that a discipline is rarely able to secure knowledge is entirely compatible with the idea that acquiring knowledge is aim of that discipline. What’s more, I maintain that progress towards this aim can be made, and measured, even if a discipline has failed to produce any such knowledge. In motivating this controversial view, I appeal to a field which has been almost entirely ignored by the scientific progress l…
Plumbing metaphysical explanatory depth
Recent years have seen increasing interest in interventionist analyses of metaphysical explanation. One area where interventionism traditionally shines, is in providing an account of explanatory depth; the sense in which explanation comes in degrees. However, the literature on metaphysical explanation has left the notion depth almost entirely unexplored. In this paper I shall attempt to rectify this oversight by motivating an interventionist anal…
A Defence of Manipulationist Noncausal Explanation
Recent years have seen growing interest in modifying interventionist accounts of causal explanation in order to characterise noncausal explanation. However, one surprising element of such accounts is that they have typically jettisoned the core feature of interventionism: interventions. Indeed, the prevailing opinion within the philosophy of science literature suggests that interventions exclusively demarcate causal relationships. This position i…
Understanding and scientific progress
Contemporary debate surrounding the nature of scientific progress has focused upon the precise role played by justification, with two realist accounts having dominated proceedings. Recently, however, a third realist account has been put forward, one which offers no role for justification at all. According to Finnur Dellsén’s (Stud Hist Philos Sci Part A 56:72–83, 2016) noetic account, science progresses when understanding increases, that is, when…
No prominent works on this page.
Understanding and scientific progress
Contemporary debate surrounding the nature of scientific progress has focused upon the precise role played by justification, with two realist accounts having dominated proceedings. Recently, however, a third realist account has been put forward, one which offers no role for justification at all. According to Finnur Dellsén’s (Stud Hist Philos Sci Part A 56:72–83, 2016) noetic account, science progresses when understanding increases, that is, when…
A Defence of Manipulationist Noncausal Explanation
Recent years have seen growing interest in modifying interventionist accounts of causal explanation in order to characterise noncausal explanation. However, one surprising element of such accounts is that they have typically jettisoned the core feature of interventionism: interventions. Indeed, the prevailing opinion within the philosophy of science literature suggests that interventions exclusively demarcate causal relationships. This position i…
Plumbing metaphysical explanatory depth
Recent years have seen increasing interest in interventionist analyses of metaphysical explanation. One area where interventionism traditionally shines, is in providing an account of explanatory depth; the sense in which explanation comes in degrees. However, the literature on metaphysical explanation has left the notion depth almost entirely unexplored. In this paper I shall attempt to rectify this oversight by motivating an interventionist anal…
Scientific Progress, Astrobiology and the Pursuit of Knowledge
In this paper, I argue that the fact that a discipline is rarely able to secure knowledge is entirely compatible with the idea that acquiring knowledge is aim of that discipline. What’s more, I maintain that progress towards this aim can be made, and measured, even if a discipline has failed to produce any such knowledge. In motivating this controversial view, I appeal to a field which has been almost entirely ignored by the scientific progress l…
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy of language (2 works) · Philosophy of mind (2 works)