Ori Hacohen
Biographic Data
| ID | 5969448 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ori Hacohen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ori |
| FAMILY NAME | Hacohen |
| SIGNATURE | HACOHEN O |
| AFFILIATIONS | Sidney M. Edelstein Center for the History and Philosophy of Science, Technology, and Medicine The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Jerusalem Israel |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9757-1202 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Error detection is not necessary for representation
Some philosophers have recently proposed an error detection condition (EDC) for representation, such that for to be a representation for system , must be capable of detecting errors in tokenings of . We argue that this condition is unmotivated, and that it is too strong. We show that theories of representation that are committed to the EDC will fail to capture cases of representation proposed to account for visual illusions
What Are Neural Representations? A Cummins Functions Approach
This paper introduces the Cummins Functions Approach to neural representations (CFA), which aims to capture the notion of representation that is relevant to contemporary neuroscientific practice. CFA shares the common view that “to be a representation of X” amounts to “having the function of tracking X,” but maintains that the relevant notion of function is defined by Robert Cummins’s account. Thus, CFA offers a notion of neural representation th…
No prominent works on this page.
What Are Neural Representations? A Cummins Functions Approach
This paper introduces the Cummins Functions Approach to neural representations (CFA), which aims to capture the notion of representation that is relevant to contemporary neuroscientific practice. CFA shares the common view that “to be a representation of X” amounts to “having the function of tracking X,” but maintains that the relevant notion of function is defined by Robert Cummins’s account. Thus, CFA offers a notion of neural representation th…
Error detection is not necessary for representation
Some philosophers have recently proposed an error detection condition (EDC) for representation, such that for to be a representation for system , must be capable of detecting errors in tokenings of . We argue that this condition is unmotivated, and that it is too strong. We show that theories of representation that are committed to the EDC will fail to capture cases of representation proposed to account for visual illusions
Philosophy and History of Science (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Cognitive science (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Context (archaeology) (1 work) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (1 work) · Epistemology (1 work) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (1 work) · Error detection and correction (1 work)