Daniel Gilman
Biographic Data
| ID | 5969780 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel Gilman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel |
| FAMILY NAME | Gilman |
| SIGNATURE | GILMAN D |
| ORCID | 0009-0009-8883-6227 |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1991 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
An Absurd Rage for Public Speaking
Optimization and simplicity
What's a Theory to do… with Seeing? or Some Empirical Considerations for Observation and Theory
Criticism of the observation/theory distinction generally supposes it to be an empirical fact that even the most basic human perception is heavily theory–laden. I offer critical examination of experimental evidence cited by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Churchland on behalf of this supposition. I argue that the empirical evidence cited is inadequate support for the claims in question. I further argue that we have empirical grounds for claiming that the Ku…
The Neurobiology of Observation
Paul Churchland has recently argued that empirical evidence strongly suggests that perception is penetrable to the beliefs or theories held by individual perceivers (1988). While there has been much discussion of the sorts of psychological cases he presents, little has been said about his arguments from neurology. I offer a critical examination of his claim that certain efferents in the brain are evidence against perceptual encapsulation. I argue…
The Neurobiology of Observation
Paul Churchland has recently argued that empirical evidence strongly suggests that perception is penetrable to the beliefs or theories held by individual perceivers (1988). While there has been much discussion of the sorts of psychological cases he presents, little has been said about his arguments from neurology. I offer a critical examination of his claim that certain efferents in the brain are evidence against perceptual encapsulation. I argue…
Optimization and simplicity
The Neurobiology of Observation
Paul Churchland has recently argued that empirical evidence strongly suggests that perception is penetrable to the beliefs or theories held by individual perceivers (1988). While there has been much discussion of the sorts of psychological cases he presents, little has been said about his arguments from neurology. I offer a critical examination of his claim that certain efferents in the brain are evidence against perceptual encapsulation. I argue…
What's a Theory to do… with Seeing? or Some Empirical Considerations for Observation and Theory
Criticism of the observation/theory distinction generally supposes it to be an empirical fact that even the most basic human perception is heavily theory–laden. I offer critical examination of experimental evidence cited by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Churchland on behalf of this supposition. I argue that the empirical evidence cited is inadequate support for the claims in question. I further argue that we have empirical grounds for claiming that the Ku…
Optimization and simplicity
An Absurd Rage for Public Speaking
Psychology (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Empirical evidence (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Perception (2 works) · Philosophy of science (2 works) · Absurdism (1 works)