Roberto Festa
Biographic Data
| ID | 5969862 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Roberto Festa |
| GIVEN NAMES | Roberto |
| FAMILY NAME | Festa |
| SIGNATURE | FESTA R |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Trieste |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7021-0490 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 30 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1986 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Approaching deterministic and probabilistic truth
The basic problem of a theory of truth approximation is defining when a theory is “close to the truth” about some relevant domain. Existing accounts of truthlikeness or verisimilitude address this problem, but are usually limited to the problem of approaching a “deterministic” truth by means of deterministic theories. A general theory of truth approximation, however, should arguably cover also cases where either the relevant theories, or “the tru…
A partial consequence account of truthlikeness
Unfolding the Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation
We explore the grammar of Bayesian confirmation by focusing on some likelihood principles, including the Weak Law of Likelihood. We show that none of the likelihood principles proposed so far is satisfied by all incremental measures of confirmation, and we argue that some of these measures indeed obey new, prima facie strange, antilikelihood principles. To prove this, we introduce a new measure that violates the Weak Law of Likelihood while satis…
Verisimilitude and belief change for nomic conjunctive theories
For unto every one that hath shall be given”. Matthew properties for incremental confirmation
“Merely a logician’s toy?” Belief revision confronting scientific theory change
Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence
Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning. Huber ([2005]) has provided a novel criticism of Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by uncertain evidence. In this paper, we argue that under a properly defined Bayesian account of confirmation by uncertain evidence, Huber's criticism fails. By contrast, our discussion will highlight what we take a…
Verisimilitude, cross classification and prediction logic. Approaching the statistical truth by falsified qualitative theories
Cognitive Structures in Scientific Inquiry
A measure for the distance between an interval hypothesis and the truth
Verisimilitude and belief change for nomic conjunctive theories
A partial consequence account of truthlikeness
For unto every one that hath shall be given”. Matthew properties for incremental confirmation
A measure for the distance between an interval hypothesis and the truth
Unfolding the Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation
We explore the grammar of Bayesian confirmation by focusing on some likelihood principles, including the Weak Law of Likelihood. We show that none of the likelihood principles proposed so far is satisfied by all incremental measures of confirmation, and we argue that some of these measures indeed obey new, prima facie strange, antilikelihood principles. To prove this, we introduce a new measure that violates the Weak Law of Likelihood while satis…
A measure for the distance between an interval hypothesis and the truth
Cognitive Structures in Scientific Inquiry
Verisimilitude, cross classification and prediction logic. Approaching the statistical truth by falsified qualitative theories
Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence
Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning. Huber ([2005]) has provided a novel criticism of Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by uncertain evidence. In this paper, we argue that under a properly defined Bayesian account of confirmation by uncertain evidence, Huber's criticism fails. By contrast, our discussion will highlight what we take a…
“Merely a logician’s toy?” Belief revision confronting scientific theory change
For unto every one that hath shall be given”. Matthew properties for incremental confirmation
Verisimilitude and belief change for nomic conjunctive theories
Unfolding the Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation
We explore the grammar of Bayesian confirmation by focusing on some likelihood principles, including the Weak Law of Likelihood. We show that none of the likelihood principles proposed so far is satisfied by all incremental measures of confirmation, and we argue that some of these measures indeed obey new, prima facie strange, antilikelihood principles. To prove this, we introduce a new measure that violates the Weak Law of Likelihood while satis…
A partial consequence account of truthlikeness
Approaching deterministic and probabilistic truth
The basic problem of a theory of truth approximation is defining when a theory is “close to the truth” about some relevant domain. Existing accounts of truthlikeness or verisimilitude address this problem, but are usually limited to the problem of approaching a “deterministic” truth by means of deterministic theories. A general theory of truth approximation, however, should arguably cover also cases where either the relevant theories, or “the tru…
Epistemology (10 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Computer Science (9 works) · Philosophy of science (8 works) · Mathematics (7 works) · Mathematical economics (6 works) · Metaphysics (5 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (5 works) · Philosophy of language (5 works) · Verisimilitude (5 works)