John-Michael Kuczynski
Biographic Data
| ID | 5979413 |
|---|---|
| NAME | John-Michael Kuczynski |
| GIVEN NAMES | John-Michael |
| FAMILY NAME | Kuczynski |
| SIGNATURE | KUCZYNSKI J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Virginia Commonwealth University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Boguslawski's analysis of quantification in natural language (translated and otherwise adapted for use by philosophers of language)
Intensionality, modality, and rationality
Does possible world semantics turn all propositions into necessary ones
The concept of a symbol and the vacuousness of the symbolic conception of thought
According to many research programs in philosophy and psychology, we think in symbols. I argue that, on pain of a vicious regress, these internal symbols cannot themselves be grasped through symbols. At the same time, anything that is functioning as a symbol is necessarily grasped. Thus the symbolic conception of thought (SCT) actually entails that we grasp some things non-symbolically, and is therefore self-undermining. In response to this argum…
A non-Russellian treatment of the referential-attributive distinction
Kripke made a good case that “...the phi...” is not semantically ambiguous between referential and attributive meanings. Russell says that “...the phi...” is always to be analyzed attributively. Many semanticists, agreeing with Kripke that “...the phi...” is not ambiguous, have tried to give a Russellian analysis of the referential-attributive distinction: the gross deviations between what is communicated by “...the phi..”, on the one hand, and w…
A quasi-materialist, quasi-dualist solution to the mind-body problem
If the mental can affect, or be affected by, the physical, then the mental must itself be physical. Otherwise the physical world would not be explanatorily closed. But it is closed. There are reasons to hold that materialism (in both its reductive and non-reductive varieties) is false. So how are we to explain the apparent responsiveness of the physical to the mental and vice versa? The only possible solution seems to be this: physical objects ar…
The concept of a symbol and the vacuousness of the symbolic conception of thought
According to many research programs in philosophy and psychology, we think in symbols. I argue that, on pain of a vicious regress, these internal symbols cannot themselves be grasped through symbols. At the same time, anything that is functioning as a symbol is necessarily grasped. Thus the symbolic conception of thought (SCT) actually entails that we grasp some things non-symbolically, and is therefore self-undermining. In response to this argum…
A non-Russellian treatment of the referential-attributive distinction
Kripke made a good case that “...the phi...” is not semantically ambiguous between referential and attributive meanings. Russell says that “...the phi...” is always to be analyzed attributively. Many semanticists, agreeing with Kripke that “...the phi...” is not ambiguous, have tried to give a Russellian analysis of the referential-attributive distinction: the gross deviations between what is communicated by “...the phi..”, on the one hand, and w…
A quasi-materialist, quasi-dualist solution to the mind-body problem
If the mental can affect, or be affected by, the physical, then the mental must itself be physical. Otherwise the physical world would not be explanatorily closed. But it is closed. There are reasons to hold that materialism (in both its reductive and non-reductive varieties) is false. So how are we to explain the apparent responsiveness of the physical to the mental and vice versa? The only possible solution seems to be this: physical objects ar…
The concept of a symbol and the vacuousness of the symbolic conception of thought
According to many research programs in philosophy and psychology, we think in symbols. I argue that, on pain of a vicious regress, these internal symbols cannot themselves be grasped through symbols. At the same time, anything that is functioning as a symbol is necessarily grasped. Thus the symbolic conception of thought (SCT) actually entails that we grasp some things non-symbolically, and is therefore self-undermining. In response to this argum…
Does possible world semantics turn all propositions into necessary ones
Boguslawski's analysis of quantification in natural language (translated and otherwise adapted for use by philosophers of language)
Intensionality, modality, and rationality
Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Linguistics (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works)