John K Warden
Biographic Data
| ID | 5994598 |
|---|---|
| NAME | John K Warden |
| GIVEN NAMES | John K |
| FAMILY NAME | Warden |
| SIGNATURE | WARDEN J K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Institute for Security Studies |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6611-5415 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Golden Dome and arms control
The Trump administration identified arms control talks with Russia and China as an early priority. At the same time, the US President directed the Defense Department to develop a comprehensive air and missile defense system for the United States, and potentially for forward-deployed forces and allies as well. The interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms will complicate, but not necessarily derail, the administration’s stra…
Limiting North Korea’s Coercive Nuclear Leverage
The US and allied goal should be to deter the use of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities rather than to destroy them
After Nuclear First Use, What
If a conflict breaks out in Asia or Europe, an adversary of the United States and its allies may believe it can conduct limited nuclear strikes and, rather than precipitate its own destruction, win the war
The Strategic Rationale for Maritime Tension Reduction in the Yellow Sea
Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age
Discussions about the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance are making a comeback. During the Cold War, U.S. analysts focused primarily on Western Europe, but in recent years the challenges of extended deterrence and assurance have been starker in Northeast Asia. Discussing the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance involves asking how the United States can deter its adversaries and assure its allies. In both ca…
After Nuclear First Use, What
If a conflict breaks out in Asia or Europe, an adversary of the United States and its allies may believe it can conduct limited nuclear strikes and, rather than precipitate its own destruction, win the war
Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age
Discussions about the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance are making a comeback. During the Cold War, U.S. analysts focused primarily on Western Europe, but in recent years the challenges of extended deterrence and assurance have been starker in Northeast Asia. Discussing the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance involves asking how the United States can deter its adversaries and assure its allies. In both ca…
The Strategic Rationale for Maritime Tension Reduction in the Yellow Sea
After Nuclear First Use, What
If a conflict breaks out in Asia or Europe, an adversary of the United States and its allies may believe it can conduct limited nuclear strikes and, rather than precipitate its own destruction, win the war
Limiting North Korea’s Coercive Nuclear Leverage
The US and allied goal should be to deter the use of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities rather than to destroy them
Golden Dome and arms control
The Trump administration identified arms control talks with Russia and China as an early priority. At the same time, the US President directed the Defense Department to develop a comprehensive air and missile defense system for the United States, and potentially for forward-deployed forces and allies as well. The interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms will complicate, but not necessarily derail, the administration’s stra…
Nuclear Issues and Defense (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Engineering (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Computer security (2 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (2 works) · Korean Peninsula Historical and Political Studies (2 works) · Law (2 works)