Julien Murzi
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995136 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Julien Murzi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Julien |
| FAMILY NAME | Murzi |
| SIGNATURE | MURZI J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Salzburg |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5360-927X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Reasoning with Attitude
Semantic orthodoxy since Frege has it that the content of a sentence (in context) is given by its truth conditions, and that the content of a subsentential expression is given by its contribution to the truth conditions of the sentences in which it may occur. This semantic paradigm is widely adopted in contemporary philosophy of language as well as in linguistics departments. However, widespread and successful as it is, it has long been challenge…
Categoricity by convention
On a widespread naturalist view, the meanings of mathematical terms are determined, and can only be determined, by the way we use mathematical language—in particular, by the basic mathematical principles we’re disposed to accept. But it’s mysterious how this can be so, since, as is well known, minimally strong first-order theories are non-categorical and so are compatible with countless non-isomorphic interpretations. As for second-order theories…
Naïve validity
Beall and Murzi (J Philos 110(3):143–165, 2013) introduce an object-linguistic predicate for naïve validity , governed by intuitive principles that are inconsistent with the classical structural rules (over sufficiently expressive base theories). As a consequence, they suggest that revisionary approaches to semantic paradox must be substructural. In response to Beall and Murzi, Field (Notre Dame J Form Log 58(1):1–19, 2017) has argued that naïve …
Naïve validity
Beall and Murzi (J Philos 110(3):143–165, 2013) introduce an object-linguistic predicate for naïve validity , governed by intuitive principles that are inconsistent with the classical structural rules (over sufficiently expressive base theories). As a consequence, they suggest that revisionary approaches to semantic paradox must be substructural. In response to Beall and Murzi, Field (Notre Dame J Form Log 58(1):1–19, 2017) has argued that naïve …
Categoricity by convention
On a widespread naturalist view, the meanings of mathematical terms are determined, and can only be determined, by the way we use mathematical language—in particular, by the basic mathematical principles we’re disposed to accept. But it’s mysterious how this can be so, since, as is well known, minimally strong first-order theories are non-categorical and so are compatible with countless non-isomorphic interpretations. As for second-order theories…
Naïve validity
Beall and Murzi (J Philos 110(3):143–165, 2013) introduce an object-linguistic predicate for naïve validity , governed by intuitive principles that are inconsistent with the classical structural rules (over sufficiently expressive base theories). As a consequence, they suggest that revisionary approaches to semantic paradox must be substructural. In response to Beall and Murzi, Field (Notre Dame J Form Log 58(1):1–19, 2017) has argued that naïve …
Reasoning with Attitude
Semantic orthodoxy since Frege has it that the content of a sentence (in context) is given by its truth conditions, and that the content of a subsentential expression is given by its contribution to the truth conditions of the sentences in which it may occur. This semantic paradigm is widely adopted in contemporary philosophy of language as well as in linguistics departments. However, widespread and successful as it is, it has long been challenge…
Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Linguistics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Pure mathematics (2 works) · Advanced Algebra and Logic (1 work) · Analytic philosophy (1 work)