Vicente Raja
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995228 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Vicente Raja |
| GIVEN NAMES | Vicente |
| FAMILY NAME | Raja |
| SIGNATURE | RAJA V |
| AFFILIATIONS | Western University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5780-9052 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Dynamical Cognitive Science! Wherefore Art Thou?
This topic revisits and elucidates the impact of dynamical systems theory (DST) since the “dynamical hypothesis” was presented in the 1990s as an alternative to the information‐processing approaches central to orthodox cognitive science. The dynamical hypothesis does not investigate cognition as necessitating explanations in computational or representational terms. Instead, DST is leveraged to approach cognition in temporal terms (e.g., continuou…
Debt-free intelligence
Cognitive scientists and neuroscientists typically understand the brain as a complex communication/information-processing system. A limitation of this framework is that it requires cognitive systems to have prior knowledge about their environment to successfully perform some of their basic functions, such as perceiving. It is unclear how the source of such knowledge can be explained from within this framework. Drawing on Dennett (1981), we refer …
Places, Sociality, and Ecological Psychology
Embodiment and cognitive neuroscience
Resonance and radical embodiment
Radical embodied cognitive science and “Real Cognition”
J. J. Gibson’s most radical idea
J. J. Gibson spent most of his career developing his own theory of perception. The culmination of his work was the ecological approach to visual perception, but during more than three decades he had challenged many of the central concepts of psychology and his own convictions regarding the foundations of perception. In this article I argue that the driving force of the development of ecological psychology was Gibson’s most radical idea: that psyc…
Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience
A radical embodied cognitive neuroscience (RECN) based on ecological psychology requires the understanding of the brain, its structure, and its functions to be compatible with the main tenets of the Gibsonian theory. In this paper, we propose neural reuse as a promising candidate to achieve such understanding. We base our proposal on two fundamental ideas. In section two, we review what we take to be the two central requirements for a RECN based …
From Kepler to Gibson
We argue that the idea of embodiment and the strategies for carrying out embodied approaches are some of the most prevalent and interdisciplinary legacies of early modern science. The idea of embodiment is simple: to explain the behavior of bodies, we must understand them as unified wholes in their environments. Embodied approaches eschew explanations in terms of qualitative descriptions of the intrinsic properties of bodies and promote explanati…
From Kepler to Gibson
We argue that the idea of embodiment and the strategies for carrying out embodied approaches are some of the most prevalent and interdisciplinary legacies of early modern science. The idea of embodiment is simple: to explain the behavior of bodies, we must understand them as unified wholes in their environments. Embodied approaches eschew explanations in terms of qualitative descriptions of the intrinsic properties of bodies and promote explanati…
J. J. Gibson’s most radical idea
J. J. Gibson spent most of his career developing his own theory of perception. The culmination of his work was the ecological approach to visual perception, but during more than three decades he had challenged many of the central concepts of psychology and his own convictions regarding the foundations of perception. In this article I argue that the driving force of the development of ecological psychology was Gibson’s most radical idea: that psyc…
Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience
A radical embodied cognitive neuroscience (RECN) based on ecological psychology requires the understanding of the brain, its structure, and its functions to be compatible with the main tenets of the Gibsonian theory. In this paper, we propose neural reuse as a promising candidate to achieve such understanding. We base our proposal on two fundamental ideas. In section two, we review what we take to be the two central requirements for a RECN based …
Resonance and radical embodiment
Radical embodied cognitive science and “Real Cognition”
Embodiment and cognitive neuroscience
Places, Sociality, and Ecological Psychology
Dynamical Cognitive Science! Wherefore Art Thou?
This topic revisits and elucidates the impact of dynamical systems theory (DST) since the “dynamical hypothesis” was presented in the 1990s as an alternative to the information‐processing approaches central to orthodox cognitive science. The dynamical hypothesis does not investigate cognition as necessitating explanations in computational or representational terms. Instead, DST is leveraged to approach cognition in temporal terms (e.g., continuou…
Debt-free intelligence
Cognitive scientists and neuroscientists typically understand the brain as a complex communication/information-processing system. A limitation of this framework is that it requires cognitive systems to have prior knowledge about their environment to successfully perform some of their basic functions, such as perceiving. It is unclear how the source of such knowledge can be explained from within this framework. Drawing on Dennett (1981), we refer …
Embodied and Extended Cognition (7 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Action Observation and Synchronization (5 works) · Cognition (5 works) · Cognitive science (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Perception (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Cognitive psychology (3 works) · Embodied cognition (3 works)