Johan Gersel
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995235 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Johan Gersel |
| GIVEN NAMES | Johan |
| FAMILY NAME | Gersel |
| SIGNATURE | GERSEL J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Copenhagen Business School |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1573-5347 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Reflective Freedom and the Substantive Motive of the Will
According to most contemporary treatments, our faculty of reason is itself devoid of a motive force. We defend the contrary Kantian position which claims that our faculty of rationality, our Will, comes with a motive force of its own. Our argument takes outset in the experience of reflective freedom as this has been discussed by Frankfurt, Watson, Velleman, and Sartre. We argue that each of their theories is unable to account for central features…
Realist Thought and Truth as a Motivating Reason
Realist and anti-realists disagree about whether our practice of forming empirical judgement is governed by the layout of a mind-independent reality. This paper develops an argument in favour of disjunctivism concerning the motivating reasons provided by experience. It does so by considering what is needed to ground our empirical thinking as subject to realist norms. The argument takes outset in a form of minimal pragmatism which claims that the …
McDowell’s overlooked argument for disjunctivism - realism, self-consciousness, and knowledge
McDowell’s defence of disjunctivism is often portrayed as starting from a controversial epistemological access-internalism, which he fails to support in his writings. This paper critiques such interpretations and presents an alternative reading of McDowell’s argument in favour of disjunctivism. Taking outset in McDowell’s early debate with Michael Dummett, it is shown why disjunctivism is a consequence of McDowell’s realism combined with his acce…
The Motivating Role of Truth in Reasoning
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The Motivating Role of Truth in Reasoning
McDowell’s overlooked argument for disjunctivism - realism, self-consciousness, and knowledge
McDowell’s defence of disjunctivism is often portrayed as starting from a controversial epistemological access-internalism, which he fails to support in his writings. This paper critiques such interpretations and presents an alternative reading of McDowell’s argument in favour of disjunctivism. Taking outset in McDowell’s early debate with Michael Dummett, it is shown why disjunctivism is a consequence of McDowell’s realism combined with his acce…
Realist Thought and Truth as a Motivating Reason
Realist and anti-realists disagree about whether our practice of forming empirical judgement is governed by the layout of a mind-independent reality. This paper develops an argument in favour of disjunctivism concerning the motivating reasons provided by experience. It does so by considering what is needed to ground our empirical thinking as subject to realist norms. The argument takes outset in a form of minimal pragmatism which claims that the …
Reflective Freedom and the Substantive Motive of the Will
According to most contemporary treatments, our faculty of reason is itself devoid of a motive force. We defend the contrary Kantian position which claims that our faculty of rationality, our Will, comes with a motive force of its own. Our argument takes outset in the experience of reflective freedom as this has been discussed by Frankfurt, Watson, Velleman, and Sartre. We argue that each of their theories is unable to account for central features…
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Ontology (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 works) · Action (physics) (1 work) · Cognitive science (1 work) · Common ground (1 work)