Carlota Serrahima
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995243 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Carlota Serrahima |
| GIVEN NAMES | Carlota |
| FAMILY NAME | Serrahima |
| SIGNATURE | SERRAHIMA C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universitat de Barcelona |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9525-6508 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Self-consciousness, ψ and φ
This paper contributes to, and underpins, the project of an integrative account of psychological and bodily self-consciousness. Following a trend in the literature that uses the notion of “ownership” to discuss self-consciousness, and adapting José Luis Bermúdez’s terminology, I refer to psychological self-consciousness as “ψ-ownership” and to bodily self-consciousness as “φ-ownership.” The paper has two main aims. First, it presents a methodolog…
Apuntes para una fenomenología de la ausencia
Como probablemente sea el caso de más de uno de los compañeros presentes hoy en esta mesa, conocí a Francesc en el aula, en la asignatura de Antropología Filosófica I que él impartía en la Universidad de Barcelona. Era la primera clase que los alumnos recién llegados a la Licenciatura de Filosofía recibíamos en nuestro primer curso en la facultad —creo, los lunes. Es decir: Francesc era el primer contacto de todos los estudiantes con la filosofía…
Psychological immunity, bodily ownership, and vice versa
This paper presents a view on bodily IEM by describing, first, the structure that grounds need to have in order to yield IEM judgments, and then arguing that somatosensation has this structure. I make my case by presenting an analysis of the sense of bodily ownership. According to this analysis, there is a substantive explanatory relationship between bodily self-consciousness and psychological self-consciousness. I argue that one central virtue o…
Somatosensation and the First Person
Experientialism about the sense of bodily ownership is the view that there is something it is like to feel a body as one’s own. In this paper I argue for a particular experientialist thesis. I first present a puzzle about the relation between bodily awareness and self-consciousness, and introduce a somewhat underappreciated view on the sense of bodily ownership, Implicit Reflexivity, that points us in the right direction as to how to address this…
Sensory fields
Philosophers of perception have been readier to postulate the existence of a visual field than to acknowledge sensory fields in other modalities. In this paper, I argue that the set of phenomenal features that philosophers have relied on when positing a visual field aptly characterise, mutatis mutandis, bodily sensation. I argue, in particular, that in localised bodily sensations we experience the body as a sensory field. I first motivate this cl…
The experience of dysmenorrhea
Dysmenorrhea, or menstrual pain, is regularly suffered by 45 to 95% of menstruating women. Despite its prevalence, and despite the philosophical importance of pain as a general phenomenon, dysmenorrhea has been all but completely overlooked in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. This paper aims at rectifying this situation. We single out three properties of what is often considered the paradigmatic case of painful experience, what we call i…
Percepción y conceptos
En este artículo se presentan algunas consideraciones relativas al debate sobre si el contenido de la experiencia perceptiva es o no conceptual. En particular, se pretende formular una crítica general al proyecto conceptualista de John McDowell apelando a algunas de sus asunciones de fondo –asunciones relativas a los requisitos que toda teoría sobre la relación entre percepción y juicio ha de cumplir, y que en su caso le conducen a considerar nec…
No prominent works on this page.
Percepción y conceptos
En este artículo se presentan algunas consideraciones relativas al debate sobre si el contenido de la experiencia perceptiva es o no conceptual. En particular, se pretende formular una crítica general al proyecto conceptualista de John McDowell apelando a algunas de sus asunciones de fondo –asunciones relativas a los requisitos que toda teoría sobre la relación entre percepción y juicio ha de cumplir, y que en su caso le conducen a considerar nec…
Sensory fields
Philosophers of perception have been readier to postulate the existence of a visual field than to acknowledge sensory fields in other modalities. In this paper, I argue that the set of phenomenal features that philosophers have relied on when positing a visual field aptly characterise, mutatis mutandis, bodily sensation. I argue, in particular, that in localised bodily sensations we experience the body as a sensory field. I first motivate this cl…
The experience of dysmenorrhea
Dysmenorrhea, or menstrual pain, is regularly suffered by 45 to 95% of menstruating women. Despite its prevalence, and despite the philosophical importance of pain as a general phenomenon, dysmenorrhea has been all but completely overlooked in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. This paper aims at rectifying this situation. We single out three properties of what is often considered the paradigmatic case of painful experience, what we call i…
Somatosensation and the First Person
Experientialism about the sense of bodily ownership is the view that there is something it is like to feel a body as one’s own. In this paper I argue for a particular experientialist thesis. I first present a puzzle about the relation between bodily awareness and self-consciousness, and introduce a somewhat underappreciated view on the sense of bodily ownership, Implicit Reflexivity, that points us in the right direction as to how to address this…
Apuntes para una fenomenología de la ausencia
Como probablemente sea el caso de más de uno de los compañeros presentes hoy en esta mesa, conocí a Francesc en el aula, en la asignatura de Antropología Filosófica I que él impartía en la Universidad de Barcelona. Era la primera clase que los alumnos recién llegados a la Licenciatura de Filosofía recibíamos en nuestro primer curso en la facultad —creo, los lunes. Es decir: Francesc era el primer contacto de todos los estudiantes con la filosofía…
Psychological immunity, bodily ownership, and vice versa
This paper presents a view on bodily IEM by describing, first, the structure that grounds need to have in order to yield IEM judgments, and then arguing that somatosensation has this structure. I make my case by presenting an analysis of the sense of bodily ownership. According to this analysis, there is a substantive explanatory relationship between bodily self-consciousness and psychological self-consciousness. I argue that one central virtue o…
Self-consciousness, ψ and φ
This paper contributes to, and underpins, the project of an integrative account of psychological and bodily self-consciousness. Following a trend in the literature that uses the notion of “ownership” to discuss self-consciousness, and adapting José Luis Bermúdez’s terminology, I refer to psychological self-consciousness as “ψ-ownership” and to bodily self-consciousness as “φ-ownership.” The paper has two main aims. First, it presents a methodolog…
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Cognitive science (2 works)