Michael De
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995349 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael De |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael |
| FAMILY NAME | De |
| SIGNATURE | DE M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Utrecht University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5162-7976 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Relevance logic without impossibilities
The idea that impossibilities have an important semantic role to play is becoming widely accepted on various grounds, including grounds of relevance. I argue that this is a mistake, that it has led to various foundational objections to relevance logic, and that these objections are avoidable given a semantics that clearly distinguishes two types of conditional or inferential fallacies, namely, those concerning truth preservation from those concer…
Haecceitism and counterpart theory
David Lewis argues at length against haecceitism and goes as far as claiming that, on a certain counterpart‐theoretic construal, the doctrine is unintelligible or inconsistent. I argue, contra Lewis, that both qualitative and non‐qualitative counterpart theory are in fact committed to haecceitism, but that this commitment is harmless since what is really at stake for a counterpart theorist such as Lewis are more general supervenience claims that …
Knot much like tonk
Connectives such as Tonk have posed a significant challenge to the inferentialist. It has been recently argued (Button 2016; Button and Walsh 2018) that the classical semanticist faces an analogous problem due to the definability of “nasty connectives” under non-standard interpretations of the classical propositional vocabulary. In this paper, we defend the classical semanticist from this alleged problem
Truthmakers or truthmaking supervenience
I argue that counterpart theory is incompatible with truthmaking supervenience, the thesis that truth supervenes on what there is and how things are. I further argue that David Lewis’s “qua” strategy for providing ontologically innocent and Humean-friendly truthmakers for predications faces a number of difficulties. I propose and assess various solutions to those difficulties, each of which comes at the cost of sacrificing one of the two main vir…
Intrinsicality and counterpart theory
Intrinsicality and counterpart theory
Truthmakers or truthmaking supervenience
I argue that counterpart theory is incompatible with truthmaking supervenience, the thesis that truth supervenes on what there is and how things are. I further argue that David Lewis’s “qua” strategy for providing ontologically innocent and Humean-friendly truthmakers for predications faces a number of difficulties. I propose and assess various solutions to those difficulties, each of which comes at the cost of sacrificing one of the two main vir…
Haecceitism and counterpart theory
David Lewis argues at length against haecceitism and goes as far as claiming that, on a certain counterpart‐theoretic construal, the doctrine is unintelligible or inconsistent. I argue, contra Lewis, that both qualitative and non‐qualitative counterpart theory are in fact committed to haecceitism, but that this commitment is harmless since what is really at stake for a counterpart theorist such as Lewis are more general supervenience claims that …
Knot much like tonk
Connectives such as Tonk have posed a significant challenge to the inferentialist. It has been recently argued (Button 2016; Button and Walsh 2018) that the classical semanticist faces an analogous problem due to the definability of “nasty connectives” under non-standard interpretations of the classical propositional vocabulary. In this paper, we defend the classical semanticist from this alleged problem
Relevance logic without impossibilities
The idea that impossibilities have an important semantic role to play is becoming widely accepted on various grounds, including grounds of relevance. I argue that this is a mistake, that it has led to various foundational objections to relevance logic, and that these objections are avoidable given a semantics that clearly distinguishes two types of conditional or inferential fallacies, namely, those concerning truth preservation from those concer…
Epistemology (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works) · Advanced Algebra and Logic (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works)