Michael Vollmer
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995493 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael Vollmer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael |
| FAMILY NAME | Vollmer |
| SIGNATURE | VOLLMER M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Heidelberg University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9522-0107 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Inability, Perspective, and the Deliberative Ought
Many scholars maintain that the kind of ‘ought’ which the subject is after in deliberation is constrained by the subject’s perspective or by what is feasible for that subject. One principle invoked in support of this position refers to a special guidance-giving feature of the deliberative ought. While being a promising way to support the perspectivist and feasibilist verdicts, this appeal to guidance has been subject to detrimental counterexample…
What if I Am Wrong? A Defence of Encroachment
Over the past years, proponents of pragmatic encroachment have been challenged to provide a plausible demarcation of the kind of practical factors that are supposed to encroach on the epistemic assessment of one’s belief formation. In this paper, I provide a defence of pragmatic encroachment against these challenges by relying on the following principle: the practical factors of a situation relevant for pragmatic encroachment are those which, on …
In defence of object-given reasons
One recurrent objection to the idea that the right kind of reasons for or against an attitude are object-given reasons for or against that attitude is that object-given reasons for or against belief and disbelief are incapable of explaining certain features of epistemic normativity. Prohibitive balancing, the behaviour of bare statistical evidence, information about future or easily available evidence, pragmatic and moral encroachment, as well as…
Epistemic Value as Attributive Goodness
According to insulationism, a common take on epistemic value, being of epistemic value does not entail being of value simpliciter. In this paper, I explore one version of insulationism which has so far received little attention in the literature. On this view, epistemic value does not entail value simpliciter because it is a form of attributive goodness, that is, being good as a member of a particular kind. While having a significant advantage ov…
The puzzle of defeated suspension
As scholars have commonly observed, a central difference between epistemic and practical normativity is the fact that the reasons of the former kind balance prohibitively, while reasons of the latter kind do so permissively. To explain the prohibition to believe or disbelieve in the face of tied evidence, several scholars have appealed to normative reasons in favour of a third doxastic option, the suspension of judgement. However, the question re…
Against zetetic encroachment
Proponents of zetetic encroachment claim that certain zetetic or inquiry-related considerations can have a bearing on the epistemic rationality of one’s belief formation. Since facts about the interestingness or importance of a topic can be the right kind of reasons for inquisitive attitudes, such as curiosity, and inquisitive attitudes are ways to suspend judgement, these facts also amount to reasons against believing. This mechanism is said to …
Jahre Master Sozialmanagement – eine Zwischenbilanz
Jahre Master Sozialmanagement – eine Zwischenbilanz
Intellektuelle Emigration
Intellektuelle Emigration
No prominent works on this page.
Intellektuelle Emigration
Intellektuelle Emigration
Jahre Master Sozialmanagement – eine Zwischenbilanz
Jahre Master Sozialmanagement – eine Zwischenbilanz
In defence of object-given reasons
One recurrent objection to the idea that the right kind of reasons for or against an attitude are object-given reasons for or against that attitude is that object-given reasons for or against belief and disbelief are incapable of explaining certain features of epistemic normativity. Prohibitive balancing, the behaviour of bare statistical evidence, information about future or easily available evidence, pragmatic and moral encroachment, as well as…
Epistemic Value as Attributive Goodness
According to insulationism, a common take on epistemic value, being of epistemic value does not entail being of value simpliciter. In this paper, I explore one version of insulationism which has so far received little attention in the literature. On this view, epistemic value does not entail value simpliciter because it is a form of attributive goodness, that is, being good as a member of a particular kind. While having a significant advantage ov…
The puzzle of defeated suspension
As scholars have commonly observed, a central difference between epistemic and practical normativity is the fact that the reasons of the former kind balance prohibitively, while reasons of the latter kind do so permissively. To explain the prohibition to believe or disbelieve in the face of tied evidence, several scholars have appealed to normative reasons in favour of a third doxastic option, the suspension of judgement. However, the question re…
Against zetetic encroachment
Proponents of zetetic encroachment claim that certain zetetic or inquiry-related considerations can have a bearing on the epistemic rationality of one’s belief formation. Since facts about the interestingness or importance of a topic can be the right kind of reasons for inquisitive attitudes, such as curiosity, and inquisitive attitudes are ways to suspend judgement, these facts also amount to reasons against believing. This mechanism is said to …
What if I Am Wrong? A Defence of Encroachment
Over the past years, proponents of pragmatic encroachment have been challenged to provide a plausible demarcation of the kind of practical factors that are supposed to encroach on the epistemic assessment of one’s belief formation. In this paper, I provide a defence of pragmatic encroachment against these challenges by relying on the following principle: the practical factors of a situation relevant for pragmatic encroachment are those which, on …
Inability, Perspective, and the Deliberative Ought
Many scholars maintain that the kind of ‘ought’ which the subject is after in deliberation is constrained by the subject’s perspective or by what is feasible for that subject. One principle invoked in support of this position refers to a special guidance-giving feature of the deliberative ought. While being a promising way to support the perspectivist and feasibilist verdicts, this appeal to guidance has been subject to detrimental counterexample…
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works) · 20th century (2 works) · Bibliography (2 works)