Eli Shupe
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995504 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Eli Shupe |
| GIVEN NAMES | Eli |
| FAMILY NAME | Shupe |
| SIGNATURE | SHUPE E |
| AFFILIATIONS | The University of Texas at Arlington |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7351-1659 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Grave injustice
Despite a growing sensitivity to the ethics of whole body donation in the field of clinical anatomy, the remains of unclaimed individuals continue to be used in healthcare teaching and research throughout the USA. I argue that this practice is unethical because of its disregard for autonomy and consent, its potential harm to various individuals and groups, considerations of justice and the threat that it poses to public trust in medical instituti…
Value in a limitless world
We argue that three theses involving three separate areas of philosophy jointly yield an interesting but overlooked result. The first is from the metaphysics of mind, and says that everything is conscious (Panpsychism). The second is axiological, and says that, necessarily, every instance of consciousness is intrinsically valuable (Value). The third is from mereology, and says that everything has proper parts (Gunk). The result is that every non-…
Understanding Organ Stewardship
I present a bipartite model of organ stewardship that places it at the intersection of resource stewardship and gift stewardship. Though both forms of stewardship are grounded in relationships of trust, they are importantly distinct, as are the duties they confer. This bipartite model of organ stewardship functions as a beneficial instrument for understanding and resolving conflicts among transplant stakeholders. As proof of concept, I apply the …
Punishing Moral Animals
There has been recent speculation that some (nonhuman) animals are moral agents. Using a retributivist framework, I argue that if some animals are moral agents, then there are circumstances in which some of them deserve punishment. But who is best situated to punish animal wrongdoers? This paper explores the idea that the answer to this question is humans
Perceiving deviance
No prominent works on this page.
Punishing Moral Animals
There has been recent speculation that some (nonhuman) animals are moral agents. Using a retributivist framework, I argue that if some animals are moral agents, then there are circumstances in which some of them deserve punishment. But who is best situated to punish animal wrongdoers? This paper explores the idea that the answer to this question is humans
Perceiving deviance
Understanding Organ Stewardship
I present a bipartite model of organ stewardship that places it at the intersection of resource stewardship and gift stewardship. Though both forms of stewardship are grounded in relationships of trust, they are importantly distinct, as are the duties they confer. This bipartite model of organ stewardship functions as a beneficial instrument for understanding and resolving conflicts among transplant stakeholders. As proof of concept, I apply the …
Grave injustice
Despite a growing sensitivity to the ethics of whole body donation in the field of clinical anatomy, the remains of unclaimed individuals continue to be used in healthcare teaching and research throughout the USA. I argue that this practice is unethical because of its disregard for autonomy and consent, its potential harm to various individuals and groups, considerations of justice and the threat that it poses to public trust in medical instituti…
Value in a limitless world
We argue that three theses involving three separate areas of philosophy jointly yield an interesting but overlooked result. The first is from the metaphysics of mind, and says that everything is conscious (Panpsychism). The second is axiological, and says that, necessarily, every instance of consciousness is intrinsically valuable (Value). The third is from mereology, and says that everything has proper parts (Gunk). The result is that every non-…
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Environmental ethics (2 works) · Ethics in medical practice (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Medicine (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Organ Donation and Transplantation (2 works)