Zuzanna Rucińska
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995555 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Zuzanna Rucińska |
| GIVEN NAMES | Zuzanna |
| FAMILY NAME | Rucińska |
| SIGNATURE | RUCIŃSKA Z |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Antwerp |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8060-8208 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Public Charades, or How the Enactivist Can Tell Apart Pretense from Non-pretense
The Visual Information Available in Virtual Reality
Perception in virtual reality is often compared to the perception of pictures. There are, however, important differences. A virtual reality environment, unlike a picture, is interactive and immersive. These properties give rise to novel theoretical challenges. Building on James J. Gibson’s analysis of the perception of depictions, we raise three questions about perception in virtual reality, to which we offer tentative answers: (1) Is virtual rea…
Pretense as alternative sense-making
The project of this paper is to synthesize enactivist cognitive science and practice theory in order to develop a new account of pretend play. Pretend play is usually conceived of as a representationalist phenomenon where a pretender projects a fictional mental representation onto reality. It thus seems that pretense can only be explained in representationalist terms. In this paper, we oppose this usual approach. We instead propose not only new e…
Pretense and imagination from the perspective of 4E cognitive science
Praxeological Enactivism vs. Radical Enactivism
In his recent paper “Getting Real About Pretense: A Radical Enactivist Proposal”, Daniel Hutto raises several objections against our so-called praxeological enactivist account of pretense (Weichold & Rucińska 2022). He argues that one should, instead, adopt his radical enactivist explanation of pretend play. In this short reply, we defend our praxeological enactivist account against his objections, and argue that it has crucial advantages over hi…
Imaginary friend play in light of enactivism
Review of psychological data of how children engage in imaginary friend play (IFP) shows that it involves a lot of explicit embodied action and interaction with surrounding people and environments. However, IFP is still seen as principally an individualistic activity, where, in addition to those interactions, the actor has to mentally represent an absent entity in imagination in order to engage in IFP. This capacity is deemed necessary because th…
Enactive planning in rock climbing
Prospecting performance
Making imagination even more embodied
This paper considers the epistemic role that embodiment plays in imagining. We focus on two aspects of embodied cognition understood in its strong sense: explicit motoric processes related to performance, and neuronal processes rooted in bodily and action processes, and describe their role in imagining. The paper argues that these two aspects of strongly embodied cognition can play distinctive and positive roles in constraining imagining, thereby…
Prospecting performance
Making imagination even more embodied
This paper considers the epistemic role that embodiment plays in imagining. We focus on two aspects of embodied cognition understood in its strong sense: explicit motoric processes related to performance, and neuronal processes rooted in bodily and action processes, and describe their role in imagining. The paper argues that these two aspects of strongly embodied cognition can play distinctive and positive roles in constraining imagining, thereby…
Enactive planning in rock climbing
Enactive planning in rock climbing
Prospecting performance
Making imagination even more embodied
This paper considers the epistemic role that embodiment plays in imagining. We focus on two aspects of embodied cognition understood in its strong sense: explicit motoric processes related to performance, and neuronal processes rooted in bodily and action processes, and describe their role in imagining. The paper argues that these two aspects of strongly embodied cognition can play distinctive and positive roles in constraining imagining, thereby…
Pretense as alternative sense-making
The project of this paper is to synthesize enactivist cognitive science and practice theory in order to develop a new account of pretend play. Pretend play is usually conceived of as a representationalist phenomenon where a pretender projects a fictional mental representation onto reality. It thus seems that pretense can only be explained in representationalist terms. In this paper, we oppose this usual approach. We instead propose not only new e…
Pretense and imagination from the perspective of 4E cognitive science
Praxeological Enactivism vs. Radical Enactivism
In his recent paper “Getting Real About Pretense: A Radical Enactivist Proposal”, Daniel Hutto raises several objections against our so-called praxeological enactivist account of pretense (Weichold & Rucińska 2022). He argues that one should, instead, adopt his radical enactivist explanation of pretend play. In this short reply, we defend our praxeological enactivist account against his objections, and argue that it has crucial advantages over hi…
Imaginary friend play in light of enactivism
Review of psychological data of how children engage in imaginary friend play (IFP) shows that it involves a lot of explicit embodied action and interaction with surrounding people and environments. However, IFP is still seen as principally an individualistic activity, where, in addition to those interactions, the actor has to mentally represent an absent entity in imagination in order to engage in IFP. This capacity is deemed necessary because th…
The Visual Information Available in Virtual Reality
Perception in virtual reality is often compared to the perception of pictures. There are, however, important differences. A virtual reality environment, unlike a picture, is interactive and immersive. These properties give rise to novel theoretical challenges. Building on James J. Gibson’s analysis of the perception of depictions, we raise three questions about perception in virtual reality, to which we offer tentative answers: (1) Is virtual rea…
Public Charades, or How the Enactivist Can Tell Apart Pretense from Non-pretense
Embodied and Extended Cognition (8 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Cognitive science (7 works) · Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Action Observation and Synchronization (5 works) · Metaphysics (5 works) · Philosophy of mind (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Autopoiesis (4 works)