Kaj André Zeller
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995611 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kaj André Zeller |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kaj André |
| FAMILY NAME | Zeller |
| SIGNATURE | ZELLER K A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Leeds |
| ORCID | 0009-0004-4025-0968 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Normative Vagueness
The apparent vagueness of normative terms, such as “permissible,” “ought,” and “is better than”, raises a number of intriguing questions and has prompted a growing body of philosophical literature. This article specifically examines decision‐theoretical questions of the following kind: What ought we do when it is borderline what we ought to do? What option is best when it is indeterminate which option is best? I survey the most elaborate accounts…
Normative Vagueness
The apparent vagueness of normative predicates such as “permissible,” “wrong,” and “responsible” raises a number of intriguing questions and has prompted a growing body of philosophical literature. In this article, I review recent metaethical discussions on normative vagueness. Specifically, I examine how well different metaethical views can handle moral vagueness. I focus on reviewing recent arguments against the compatibility of robust realism …
Against metaphysics by fiat
Ruth Chang believes that one can intrinsically resolve the question of whether a vague predicate F applies to its borderline case a through arbitrary stipulation—one can resolve it by fiat. First, I clarify what it is to intrinsically resolve a question by arbitrary stipulation. Next, I argue that Chang’s view is wrong. Cases that involve vagueness are cases of (what I’ll call) competing similarity. For this reason, for any borderline case a of a…
Sartre, Virtue Ethics, and the Indirection Problem
This article addresses the ‘Indirection Problem’ in Sartrean ethics of authenticity and compares it to the problem of the same name in virtue ethics. Both ethical frameworks encounter a disharmony between core concepts and proper motivation. The article reviews the indirection problem in virtue ethics, highlighting Swanton's solution of defining virtues as promoting specific values. It then explores how Sartrean ethics faces a more profound indir…
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Sartre, Virtue Ethics, and the Indirection Problem
This article addresses the ‘Indirection Problem’ in Sartrean ethics of authenticity and compares it to the problem of the same name in virtue ethics. Both ethical frameworks encounter a disharmony between core concepts and proper motivation. The article reviews the indirection problem in virtue ethics, highlighting Swanton's solution of defining virtues as promoting specific values. It then explores how Sartrean ethics faces a more profound indir…
Against metaphysics by fiat
Ruth Chang believes that one can intrinsically resolve the question of whether a vague predicate F applies to its borderline case a through arbitrary stipulation—one can resolve it by fiat. First, I clarify what it is to intrinsically resolve a question by arbitrary stipulation. Next, I argue that Chang’s view is wrong. Cases that involve vagueness are cases of (what I’ll call) competing similarity. For this reason, for any borderline case a of a…
Normative Vagueness
The apparent vagueness of normative terms, such as “permissible,” “ought,” and “is better than”, raises a number of intriguing questions and has prompted a growing body of philosophical literature. This article specifically examines decision‐theoretical questions of the following kind: What ought we do when it is borderline what we ought to do? What option is best when it is indeterminate which option is best? I survey the most elaborate accounts…
Normative Vagueness
The apparent vagueness of normative predicates such as “permissible,” “wrong,” and “responsible” raises a number of intriguing questions and has prompted a growing body of philosophical literature. In this article, I review recent metaethical discussions on normative vagueness. Specifically, I examine how well different metaethical views can handle moral vagueness. I focus on reviewing recent arguments against the compatibility of robust realism …
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Normative (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Vagueness (2 works) · Computer Science (1 work) · Consequentialism (1 work) · Credence (1 work)