Krzysztof Poslajko
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995644 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Krzysztof Poslajko |
| GIVEN NAMES | Krzysztof |
| FAMILY NAME | Poslajko |
| SIGNATURE | POSLAJKO K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Jagiellonian University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7883-1651 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
How to be a fictionalist about corporate mentality
The aim of this paper is to present a plausible exposition of the broadly fictionalist intuitions that are often expressed in legal theory and economics regarding the attributions of mental states to corporations. The proposed “two-stage” version of fictionalism about corporate mentality is meant to combine insights from two approaches: abstract artifact theory and the make-believe view. Abstract artifact theory is used to explain facts about the…
Legislative Intent and the Hard Problem of Content
The general aim of this paper is to investigate how philosophical problems with the notion of mental content affect the debate about legislative intent. Specifically, the aim is to define and criticize the metaphysically strongest-possible version of realism about legislative intent, namely “Strong Realism”: the idea that the content of legislation is objectively determined by legislatures that are treated as irreducible group agents that are bea…
Expressivism, inferentialism, and the status of attitudes
The aim of this paper is to show that expressivism about attitudes is not a tenable position. Although this claim has been often made in the literature, traditional arguments against attitudinal expressivism assumed a dated form of expressivism. In order to show that ascriptions of attitudes cannot be seen as expressive in either of them, the paper discusses two more recent versions of expressivism: quasi-realism and inferentialist expressivism. …
The meta-metaphysics of group beliefs
The aim of this paper is to argue that our understanding of the issue of institutional group minds might be broadened if we consider alternative meta-metaphysical frameworks to those which are presently presupposed in the field. I argue that the two major camps in the contemporary philosophical debate about group beliefs, namely strong realism and eliminative reductionism, share a commitment to some form of meta-philosophical realism. Two alterna…
How to Think about the Debate over the Reality of Beliefs
The aim of this paper is to propose a new conceptualization of the distinction between realism and anti-realism about beliefs that is based on the division between natural and non-natural properties, as defined by Lewis. It will be argued that although the traditional form of anti-realism about beliefs, namely eliminative materialism, has failed (as it led to unacceptable consequences), there is a possibility to reformulate the division in questi…
The Lycan–Stich Argument and the Plasticity of “Belief”
The aim of this paper is to argue against the claim that the term “belief”, as it functions in philosophical psychology, has natural-kind term semantics; this thesis is central to the famous Lycan–Stich argument against eliminative materialism. I will argue that the current debate concerning the discrepancy between the professed opinions and actions, especially the debate concerning the idea of aliefs, shows that the concept of belief is plastic …
No prominent works on this page.
How to Think about the Debate over the Reality of Beliefs
The aim of this paper is to propose a new conceptualization of the distinction between realism and anti-realism about beliefs that is based on the division between natural and non-natural properties, as defined by Lewis. It will be argued that although the traditional form of anti-realism about beliefs, namely eliminative materialism, has failed (as it led to unacceptable consequences), there is a possibility to reformulate the division in questi…
The Lycan–Stich Argument and the Plasticity of “Belief”
The aim of this paper is to argue against the claim that the term “belief”, as it functions in philosophical psychology, has natural-kind term semantics; this thesis is central to the famous Lycan–Stich argument against eliminative materialism. I will argue that the current debate concerning the discrepancy between the professed opinions and actions, especially the debate concerning the idea of aliefs, shows that the concept of belief is plastic …
The meta-metaphysics of group beliefs
The aim of this paper is to argue that our understanding of the issue of institutional group minds might be broadened if we consider alternative meta-metaphysical frameworks to those which are presently presupposed in the field. I argue that the two major camps in the contemporary philosophical debate about group beliefs, namely strong realism and eliminative reductionism, share a commitment to some form of meta-philosophical realism. Two alterna…
Expressivism, inferentialism, and the status of attitudes
The aim of this paper is to show that expressivism about attitudes is not a tenable position. Although this claim has been often made in the literature, traditional arguments against attitudinal expressivism assumed a dated form of expressivism. In order to show that ascriptions of attitudes cannot be seen as expressive in either of them, the paper discusses two more recent versions of expressivism: quasi-realism and inferentialist expressivism. …
How to be a fictionalist about corporate mentality
The aim of this paper is to present a plausible exposition of the broadly fictionalist intuitions that are often expressed in legal theory and economics regarding the attributions of mental states to corporations. The proposed “two-stage” version of fictionalism about corporate mentality is meant to combine insights from two approaches: abstract artifact theory and the make-believe view. Abstract artifact theory is used to explain facts about the…
Legislative Intent and the Hard Problem of Content
The general aim of this paper is to investigate how philosophical problems with the notion of mental content affect the debate about legislative intent. Specifically, the aim is to define and criticize the metaphysically strongest-possible version of realism about legislative intent, namely “Strong Realism”: the idea that the content of legislation is objectively determined by legislatures that are treated as irreducible group agents that are bea…
Epistemology (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Realism (4 works) · Attribution (2 works) · Economic Theory and Institutions (2 works) · Eliminative materialism (2 works) · Materialism (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works)