Timothy R Kearl
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995714 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Timothy R Kearl |
| GIVEN NAMES | Timothy R |
| FAMILY NAME | Kearl |
| SIGNATURE | KEARL T R |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Glasgow |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6719-5549 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Epistemic Cans
We argue that S is in a position to know that p iff S can know that p. Thus, what makes position‐to‐know‐ascriptions true is just a special case of what makes ability‐ascriptions true: compossibility. The novelty of our compossibility theory of epistemic modality lies in its subsuming epistemic modality under agentive modality, the modality characterizing what agents can do
Easy Practical Knowledge in advance
We explore new connections between the epistemologies of mental rehearsal and suppositional reasoning to offer a novel perspective on skilled behavior and its relationship to practical knowledge. We argue that practical knowledge is “easy” in the sense that, by manifesting one’s skills, one has a priori propositional justification for certain beliefs about what one is doing as one does it. This proposal has wider consequences for debates about in…
A Plea for Exemptions
Evidentialism and the Problem of Basic Competence
What we know when we act
Two traditions in action theory offer different accounts of what distinguishes intentional action from mere behavior. According to the causalist tradition, intentional action has certain distinguished causal antecedents, and according to the Anscombian tradition, intentional action has certain distinguished epistemological features. I offer a way to reconcile these ostensibly conflicting accounts of intentional action by way of appealing to “abil…
Knowledge-how and the limits of defeat
How, if at all, is knowing how to do something defeasible? Some, the “intellectualists”, treat the defeasibility of knowledge-how as in some way derivative on the defeasibility of knowledge-that. According to a recent proposal by Carter and Navarro (Philos Phenomenol Res 3:662–685, 2017), knowledge-how defeat cannot be explained in terms of knowledge-that defeat; instead, knowledge-how defeat merits and entirely separate treatment. The thought be…
Knowledge-how and the limits of defeat
How, if at all, is knowing how to do something defeasible? Some, the “intellectualists”, treat the defeasibility of knowledge-how as in some way derivative on the defeasibility of knowledge-that. According to a recent proposal by Carter and Navarro (Philos Phenomenol Res 3:662–685, 2017), knowledge-how defeat cannot be explained in terms of knowledge-that defeat; instead, knowledge-how defeat merits and entirely separate treatment. The thought be…
Evidentialism and the Problem of Basic Competence
What we know when we act
Two traditions in action theory offer different accounts of what distinguishes intentional action from mere behavior. According to the causalist tradition, intentional action has certain distinguished causal antecedents, and according to the Anscombian tradition, intentional action has certain distinguished epistemological features. I offer a way to reconcile these ostensibly conflicting accounts of intentional action by way of appealing to “abil…
Knowledge-how and the limits of defeat
How, if at all, is knowing how to do something defeasible? Some, the “intellectualists”, treat the defeasibility of knowledge-how as in some way derivative on the defeasibility of knowledge-that. According to a recent proposal by Carter and Navarro (Philos Phenomenol Res 3:662–685, 2017), knowledge-how defeat cannot be explained in terms of knowledge-that defeat; instead, knowledge-how defeat merits and entirely separate treatment. The thought be…
A Plea for Exemptions
Easy Practical Knowledge in advance
We explore new connections between the epistemologies of mental rehearsal and suppositional reasoning to offer a novel perspective on skilled behavior and its relationship to practical knowledge. We argue that practical knowledge is “easy” in the sense that, by manifesting one’s skills, one has a priori propositional justification for certain beliefs about what one is doing as one does it. This proposal has wider consequences for debates about in…
Epistemic Cans
We argue that S is in a position to know that p iff S can know that p. Thus, what makes position‐to‐know‐ascriptions true is just a special case of what makes ability‐ascriptions true: compossibility. The novelty of our compossibility theory of epistemic modality lies in its subsuming epistemic modality under agentive modality, the modality characterizing what agents can do
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Action (physics) (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Philosophy of science (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (2 works) · Virtue (2 works)