Bogdan Dicher
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995863 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Bogdan Dicher |
| GIVEN NAMES | Bogdan |
| FAMILY NAME | Dicher |
| SIGNATURE | DICHER B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Lisbon |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2587-0649 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Logical Metainferentialism
Logical inferentialism is the view that the meaning of logical constants is implicitly defined by the operational rules that govern their behaviour in proofs—particularly in sequent calculus proofs, according to an increasingly dominant tendency. A tenable articulation of this view presupposes a clarification of certain crucial aspects, such as the criteria for rule harmony and what constitutes a normal proof. Sequent calculus inferentialists typ…
Non-foundationalist frameworks for logical metainferentialism
Standard accounts of logical consequence take it to be determined by valid inferences. Recently, it has been argued that valid inferences underdetermine consequence. Instead, consequence should be characterised as determined by metainferences, i.e., inferences between inferences. For all its benefits, this view faces various problems, including the fact that it appears to be incompatible with the phenomenology of the inferential practice, and the…
Substructural heresies
This paper discusses two revisionary views about substructurality. The first attempts to reduce the structural features of a logic to properties of its logical vocabulary. It will be found to be untenable. The second aims to separate the structural features of a logic from the properties of logical consequence and to reinterpreted them as sui generis proof resources. I will argue that it is a viable path for a renewed understanding of substructur…
The original sin of proof-theoretic semantics
Requiem for logical nihilism, or
Reflective Equilibrium on the Fringe
Reflective equilibrium, as a methodology for the "formation of logics," fails on the *fringe*, where intricate details can make or break a logical theory. On the fringe, the process of theorification cannot be methodologically governed by anything like reflective equilibrium. When logical theorising gets tricky, there is nothing on the pre-theoretical side on which our theoretical claims can reflect of---at least not in any meaningful way. Indeed…
On a Generality Condition in Proof‐Theoretic Semantics
In the recent literature on proof‐theoretic semantics, there is mention of a generality condition on defining rules. According to this condition, the schematic formulation of the defining rules must be maximally general, in the sense that no restrictions should be placed on the contexts of these rules. In particular, context variables must always be present in the schematic rules and they should range over arbitrary collections of formulae. I arg…
On a Generality Condition in Proof‐Theoretic Semantics
In the recent literature on proof‐theoretic semantics, there is mention of a generality condition on defining rules. According to this condition, the schematic formulation of the defining rules must be maximally general, in the sense that no restrictions should be placed on the contexts of these rules. In particular, context variables must always be present in the schematic rules and they should range over arbitrary collections of formulae. I arg…
Reflective Equilibrium on the Fringe
Reflective equilibrium, as a methodology for the "formation of logics," fails on the *fringe*, where intricate details can make or break a logical theory. On the fringe, the process of theorification cannot be methodologically governed by anything like reflective equilibrium. When logical theorising gets tricky, there is nothing on the pre-theoretical side on which our theoretical claims can reflect of---at least not in any meaningful way. Indeed…
The original sin of proof-theoretic semantics
Requiem for logical nihilism, or
Substructural heresies
This paper discusses two revisionary views about substructurality. The first attempts to reduce the structural features of a logic to properties of its logical vocabulary. It will be found to be untenable. The second aims to separate the structural features of a logic from the properties of logical consequence and to reinterpreted them as sui generis proof resources. I will argue that it is a viable path for a renewed understanding of substructur…
Non-foundationalist frameworks for logical metainferentialism
Standard accounts of logical consequence take it to be determined by valid inferences. Recently, it has been argued that valid inferences underdetermine consequence. Instead, consequence should be characterised as determined by metainferences, i.e., inferences between inferences. For all its benefits, this view faces various problems, including the fact that it appears to be incompatible with the phenomenology of the inferential practice, and the…
Logical Metainferentialism
Logical inferentialism is the view that the meaning of logical constants is implicitly defined by the operational rules that govern their behaviour in proofs—particularly in sequent calculus proofs, according to an increasingly dominant tendency. A tenable articulation of this view presupposes a clarification of certain crucial aspects, such as the criteria for rule harmony and what constitutes a normal proof. Sequent calculus inferentialists typ…
Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (7 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Advanced Algebra and Logic (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Logic, programming, and type systems (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Logical consequence (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works)