Matheus Valente
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 5995875 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Matheus Valente |
| NOMBRES | Matheus |
| APELLIDO | Valente |
| FIRMA | VALENTE M |
| AFILIACIONES | Universitat de Barcelona |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6380-2623 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 6 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 0 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2019 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 0 |
Asymmetries between 'you' and 'I'
Can others grasp my first-person thoughts, or are such thoughts inherently private? Philosophers disagree: some argue that first-person thoughts are apprehensible only by their owners, while others contend that they can be shared through communication—expressible by ‘you’ as readily as by ‘I’. In this paper, I set out to clarify the stakes of this age-long dispute. Taking J. L. Bermúdez’s forceful defence of shareability as the backdrop of my dis…
A Puzzle about Communication
Relationism and the Problem of Publicity
According to a recently developed family of relational views, whether two concepts C 1 and C 2 are the same is a matter of an external relation in which their tokens stand. In this paper, we highlight the chief contributions of Relationism in the elucidation of concept sameness, present a set of arguments to the effect that relational accounts of concept sameness fail to accommodate a substantive notion of concept publicity, and offer a diagnosis…
On Successful Communication, Intentions and False Beliefs
I discuss a criterion for successful communication between a speaker and a hearer put forward by Buchanan according to which there is communicative success only if the hearer entertains, as a result of interpreting the speaker’s utterance, a thought that has the same truth conditions as the thought asserted by the speaker and, furthermore, does so in virtue of recognizing the speaker’s communicative intentions. I argue, against Buchanan, that the…
On the representational role of Euclidean diagrams
Communicating and Disagreeing with Distinct Concepts
I suggest a solution to a conflict between semantic internalism – according to which the concepts one expresses are determined by one's use of representations – and publicity – according to which, if two subjects successfully communicate or are in genuine agreement, then they entertain thoughts constituted by the same concepts. My solution rests on the thesis that there can be successful communication and genuine agreement between thinkers employ…
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Communicating and Disagreeing with Distinct Concepts
I suggest a solution to a conflict between semantic internalism – according to which the concepts one expresses are determined by one's use of representations – and publicity – according to which, if two subjects successfully communicate or are in genuine agreement, then they entertain thoughts constituted by the same concepts. My solution rests on the thesis that there can be successful communication and genuine agreement between thinkers employ…
On Successful Communication, Intentions and False Beliefs
I discuss a criterion for successful communication between a speaker and a hearer put forward by Buchanan according to which there is communicative success only if the hearer entertains, as a result of interpreting the speaker’s utterance, a thought that has the same truth conditions as the thought asserted by the speaker and, furthermore, does so in virtue of recognizing the speaker’s communicative intentions. I argue, against Buchanan, that the…
On the representational role of Euclidean diagrams
Relationism and the Problem of Publicity
According to a recently developed family of relational views, whether two concepts C 1 and C 2 are the same is a matter of an external relation in which their tokens stand. In this paper, we highlight the chief contributions of Relationism in the elucidation of concept sameness, present a set of arguments to the effect that relational accounts of concept sameness fail to accommodate a substantive notion of concept publicity, and offer a diagnosis…
A Puzzle about Communication
Asymmetries between 'you' and 'I'
Can others grasp my first-person thoughts, or are such thoughts inherently private? Philosophers disagree: some argue that first-person thoughts are apprehensible only by their owners, while others contend that they can be shared through communication—expressible by ‘you’ as readily as by ‘I’. In this paper, I set out to clarify the stakes of this age-long dispute. Taking J. L. Bermúdez’s forceful defence of shareability as the backdrop of my dis…
Epistemology (5 obras) · Philosophy (5 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 obras) · Psychology (4 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Linguistics (2 obras) · Metaphysics (2 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 obras)