Frank Hofmann
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995908 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Frank Hofmann |
| GIVEN NAMES | Frank |
| FAMILY NAME | Hofmann |
| SIGNATURE | HOFMANN F |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Luxembourg |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9730-8930 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The norm of reasoning
The paper presents and defends a new account of reasoning. Reasoning is essentially subject to a constitutive norm, the norm of following sufficient normative reasons. Instead of rule-following, following normative reasons is essential. After clarifying the view, three arguments in its support will be presented. They concern the scope of (correct) reasoning, the value of (correct) reasoning, and the relation between reasoning and treating a consi…
Explaining Free Will by Rational Abilities
In this paper I present an account of the rational abilities that make our decisions free. Following the lead of new dispositionalists, a leeway account of free decisions is developed, and the rational abilities that ground our abilities to decide otherwise are described in detail. A main result will be that the best account of the relevant rational abilities makes them two-way abilities: abilities to decide to do or not to do x in accordance wit…
La Grande Région Philosophique Lorraine-Luxembourg
Au nom de l’Institut de philosophie de l’Université du Luxembourg, nous voudrions ici rendre hommage en peu de mots à la mémoire de notre Collègue et Ami Gilles Gourbin.Depuis plus d’une dizaine d’années, Gilles Gourbin a pris part, régulièrement et activement, à notre enseignement en tant que professeur associé au sein du programme du Bachelor en Cultures Européennes – filière philosophie de l’Université du Luxembourg. Il serait trop long de sou…
Knowledge norms of belief and belief formation
According to a currently popular view within the camp of knowledge lovers, knowledge is the norm of (full) belief. It says that no‐one should believe p without knowing that p, and thus governs the state of belief; it is a static norm. I will argue that we need an additional, structurally different knowledge norm in order to cover cases in which a subject is such that she ought to start forming a belief. So the standard view of how knowledge gover…
Epistemic Means and Ends
No prominent works on this page.
Epistemic Means and Ends
Knowledge norms of belief and belief formation
According to a currently popular view within the camp of knowledge lovers, knowledge is the norm of (full) belief. It says that no‐one should believe p without knowing that p, and thus governs the state of belief; it is a static norm. I will argue that we need an additional, structurally different knowledge norm in order to cover cases in which a subject is such that she ought to start forming a belief. So the standard view of how knowledge gover…
Explaining Free Will by Rational Abilities
In this paper I present an account of the rational abilities that make our decisions free. Following the lead of new dispositionalists, a leeway account of free decisions is developed, and the rational abilities that ground our abilities to decide otherwise are described in detail. A main result will be that the best account of the relevant rational abilities makes them two-way abilities: abilities to decide to do or not to do x in accordance wit…
La Grande Région Philosophique Lorraine-Luxembourg
Au nom de l’Institut de philosophie de l’Université du Luxembourg, nous voudrions ici rendre hommage en peu de mots à la mémoire de notre Collègue et Ami Gilles Gourbin.Depuis plus d’une dizaine d’années, Gilles Gourbin a pris part, régulièrement et activement, à notre enseignement en tant que professeur associé au sein du programme du Bachelor en Cultures Européennes – filière philosophie de l’Université du Luxembourg. Il serait trop long de sou…
The norm of reasoning
The paper presents and defends a new account of reasoning. Reasoning is essentially subject to a constitutive norm, the norm of following sufficient normative reasons. Instead of rule-following, following normative reasons is essential. After clarifying the view, three arguments in its support will be presented. They concern the scope of (correct) reasoning, the value of (correct) reasoning, and the relation between reasoning and treating a consi…
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Cognition (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 work) · Art (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Criticism (1 work)