James L D Brown
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995926 |
|---|---|
| NAME | James L D Brown |
| GIVEN NAMES | James L D |
| FAMILY NAME | Brown |
| SIGNATURE | BROWN J L D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Sheffield |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3875-592X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Theories of Well-Being and Descriptive Adequacy
It is widely held that theories of well-being must satisfy the criterion of descriptive adequacy. According to the criterion, an adequate theory of well-being must optimally fit our everyday experiences and judgments relating to well-being. This article argues that there is no such criterion that constrains theories of well-being. First, it examines in detail the reasons for which the criterion was originally introduced. Second, it argues against…
Is Rationality Normative for Reasoning
The reasoning view of rational normativity claims that structural rationality is normative for reasoning. Specifically, it claims that structural rationality gives us reasons to structure deliberation in ways that respect the requirements of rationality. This paper critically assesses the reasoning view. It argues that while the reasoning view might succeed in responding to arguments against the normativity of rationality, it is in tension with t…
Moral inferentialism and moral psychology
This paper raises a challenge for moral inferentialism. Moral inferentialism explains moral discourse in terms of the distinctive kinds of discursive commitments we acknowledge and undertake in making moral claims. However, like any metaethical theory, inferentialism owes us an account not only of what it is to make moral claims, but of what it is to think moral thoughts. The paper argues that what inferentialists have said about moral thought is…
Integrating the Philosophy and Psychology of Well-Being
This paper examines the integration and unification of the philosophy and psychology of well-being. For the most part, these disciplines investigate well-being without reference to each other. In recent years, however, with the maturing of each discipline, there have been a growing number of calls to integrate the two. While such calls are welcome, what it means to integrate well-being philosophy and psychology can vary greatly depending on one’s…
On Scepticism About Ought Simpliciter
Scepticism about ought simpliciter is the view that there is no such thing as what one ought simpliciter to do. Instead, practical deliberation is governed by a plurality of normative standpoints, each authoritative from their own perspective but none authoritative simpliciter. This paper aims to resist such scepticism. After setting out the challenge in general terms, I argue that scepticism can be resisted by rejecting a key assumption in the s…
Interpretative expressivism
Metaethical expressivism is typically characterised as the view that normative statements express desire-like attitudes instead of beliefs. However, in this paper I argue that expressivists should claim that normative statements express beliefs in normative propositions, and not merely in some deflationary sense but in a theoretically robust sense explicated by a theory of propositional attitudes. I first argue that this can be achieved by combin…
Against Being For
Expressivism is the view that normative claims express nondescriptive, practical attitudes. It is widely assumed that this involves denying that normative claims express beliefs, except in a minimal or deflationary sense. However, this assumption is increasingly being called into question. Instead, it is argued, expressivists can and should provide a robust, nondescriptive theory of belief in general which can explain the difference between ordin…
No prominent works on this page.
Interpretative expressivism
Metaethical expressivism is typically characterised as the view that normative statements express desire-like attitudes instead of beliefs. However, in this paper I argue that expressivists should claim that normative statements express beliefs in normative propositions, and not merely in some deflationary sense but in a theoretically robust sense explicated by a theory of propositional attitudes. I first argue that this can be achieved by combin…
Against Being For
Expressivism is the view that normative claims express nondescriptive, practical attitudes. It is widely assumed that this involves denying that normative claims express beliefs, except in a minimal or deflationary sense. However, this assumption is increasingly being called into question. Instead, it is argued, expressivists can and should provide a robust, nondescriptive theory of belief in general which can explain the difference between ordin…
Integrating the Philosophy and Psychology of Well-Being
This paper examines the integration and unification of the philosophy and psychology of well-being. For the most part, these disciplines investigate well-being without reference to each other. In recent years, however, with the maturing of each discipline, there have been a growing number of calls to integrate the two. While such calls are welcome, what it means to integrate well-being philosophy and psychology can vary greatly depending on one’s…
On Scepticism About Ought Simpliciter
Scepticism about ought simpliciter is the view that there is no such thing as what one ought simpliciter to do. Instead, practical deliberation is governed by a plurality of normative standpoints, each authoritative from their own perspective but none authoritative simpliciter. This paper aims to resist such scepticism. After setting out the challenge in general terms, I argue that scepticism can be resisted by rejecting a key assumption in the s…
Is Rationality Normative for Reasoning
The reasoning view of rational normativity claims that structural rationality is normative for reasoning. Specifically, it claims that structural rationality gives us reasons to structure deliberation in ways that respect the requirements of rationality. This paper critically assesses the reasoning view. It argues that while the reasoning view might succeed in responding to arguments against the normativity of rationality, it is in tension with t…
Moral inferentialism and moral psychology
This paper raises a challenge for moral inferentialism. Moral inferentialism explains moral discourse in terms of the distinctive kinds of discursive commitments we acknowledge and undertake in making moral claims. However, like any metaethical theory, inferentialism owes us an account not only of what it is to make moral claims, but of what it is to think moral thoughts. The paper argues that what inferentialists have said about moral thought is…
Theories of Well-Being and Descriptive Adequacy
It is widely held that theories of well-being must satisfy the criterion of descriptive adequacy. According to the criterion, an adequate theory of well-being must optimally fit our everyday experiences and judgments relating to well-being. This article argues that there is no such criterion that constrains theories of well-being. First, it examines in detail the reasons for which the criterion was originally introduced. Second, it argues against…
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Normative (5 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Expressivism (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works)