Karl Gustav Bergman
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995947 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Karl Gustav Bergman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Karl Gustav |
| FAMILY NAME | Bergman |
| SIGNATURE | BERGMAN K G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Uppsala University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9635-6762 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Teleosemantics and Universal Hybridity
According to Ruth Millikan, some representations are hybrid: they have both descriptive and directive content, both mind-to-world and world-to-mind direction of fit. Millikan calls them “pushmi-pullyu representations,” and they play an important role in her overall framework. Marc Artiga, however, has argued that the pushmi-pullyu doctrine puts Millikan’s entire edifice at risk. It has the unfortunate implication that all representations are hybr…
Living with semantic indeterminacy
Teleosemantics has an indeterminacy problem. In an earlier publication, I argued that teleosemanticists may afford to be realists about indeterminacy, pointing to the phenomenon of vagueness as a case of really‐existing semantic indeterminacy. Here, I continue that project by proposing two criteria of adequacy that a semantically indeterminate theory should meet: a criterion of theoretical adequacy and a criterion of extensional adequacy. I prese…
Internalism and Culpable Irrationality
According to internalism about rationality, the ir/rationality of a subject depends only on how things appear from her subjective perspective. According to culpabilism, rationality is a normative standard such that violations of rationality are (at least sometimes) blameworthy. According to a classical line of reasoning, culpabilism entails internalism. I argue that, to the contrary, culpabilism entails that internalism is false. The internalist …
Should the teleosemanticist be afraid of semantic indeterminacy
The teleosemantic indeterminacy problem has generated much discussion but no consensus. One possible solution is to accept indeterminacy as a real feature of some representations. I call this view “indeterminacy realism.” In this paper, I argue that indeterminacy realism should be treated as a serious option. By drawing an analogy with vagueness, I try to show that accepting the reality of indeterminacy would not be catastrophic for teleosemantic…
The force of fictional discourse
Consider the opening sentence of Tolkien’s The Hobbit : (1) In a hole in the ground there lived a hobbit. By writing this sentence, Tolkien is making a fictional statement . There are two influential views of the nature of such statements. On the pretense view, fictional discourse amounts to pretend assertions. Since the author is not really asserting, but merely pretending, a statement such as Tolkien’s is devoid of illocutionary force altogethe…
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The force of fictional discourse
Consider the opening sentence of Tolkien’s The Hobbit : (1) In a hole in the ground there lived a hobbit. By writing this sentence, Tolkien is making a fictional statement . There are two influential views of the nature of such statements. On the pretense view, fictional discourse amounts to pretend assertions. Since the author is not really asserting, but merely pretending, a statement such as Tolkien’s is devoid of illocutionary force altogethe…
Should the teleosemanticist be afraid of semantic indeterminacy
The teleosemantic indeterminacy problem has generated much discussion but no consensus. One possible solution is to accept indeterminacy as a real feature of some representations. I call this view “indeterminacy realism.” In this paper, I argue that indeterminacy realism should be treated as a serious option. By drawing an analogy with vagueness, I try to show that accepting the reality of indeterminacy would not be catastrophic for teleosemantic…
Living with semantic indeterminacy
Teleosemantics has an indeterminacy problem. In an earlier publication, I argued that teleosemanticists may afford to be realists about indeterminacy, pointing to the phenomenon of vagueness as a case of really‐existing semantic indeterminacy. Here, I continue that project by proposing two criteria of adequacy that a semantically indeterminate theory should meet: a criterion of theoretical adequacy and a criterion of extensional adequacy. I prese…
Internalism and Culpable Irrationality
According to internalism about rationality, the ir/rationality of a subject depends only on how things appear from her subjective perspective. According to culpabilism, rationality is a normative standard such that violations of rationality are (at least sometimes) blameworthy. According to a classical line of reasoning, culpabilism entails internalism. I argue that, to the contrary, culpabilism entails that internalism is false. The internalist …
Teleosemantics and Universal Hybridity
According to Ruth Millikan, some representations are hybrid: they have both descriptive and directive content, both mind-to-world and world-to-mind direction of fit. Millikan calls them “pushmi-pullyu representations,” and they play an important role in her overall framework. Marc Artiga, however, has argued that the pushmi-pullyu doctrine puts Millikan’s entire edifice at risk. It has the unfortunate implication that all representations are hybr…
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Language, Metaphor, and Cognition (2 works) · Ontology (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Analogy (1 work) · Anthropology (1 work)