Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995960 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Katarzyna |
| FAMILY NAME | Paprzycka-Hausman |
| SIGNATURE | PAPRZYCKA-HAUSMAN K |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Warsaw |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9956-6650 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Does reflection reduce the epistemic side‐effect effect? A new challenge to error accounts
The epistemic side‐effect effect consists of an asymmetric pattern of knowledge attributions in harm and help cases, paralleling the Knobe effect for intentionality attributions. Error‐based accounts suggest the asymmetries arise from performance errors in harm cases. We challenge this claim with three new experimental studies designed to reduce errors. First, we presented harm and help cases simultaneously. Second, participants completed the cog…
The Doxastic Heuristic and the Consequence Account of the Epistemic Side-Effect Effect
We discuss two philosophical explanations of the epistemic side-effect effect: the doxastic heuristic account (Alfano et al. The Monist 95 (2): 264–289, 2012) and the consequence account (Paprzycka-Hausman Synthese 197: 5457–5490, 2020). We argue that the doxastic heuristic account has problems with explaining knowledge attributions in cases where the probability that the side effect will occur is low and where the side effect does not ultimately…
Knowledge of consequences
The Knobe effect (Analysis 63(3):190–194, 2003a) consists in our tendency to attribute intentionality to bringing about a side effect when it is morally bad but not when it is morally good. Beebe and Buckwalter (Mind Lang 25:474–498, 2010) have demonstrated that there is an epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE): people are more inclined to attribute knowledge when the side effect is bad in Knobe-type cases. ESEE is quite robust. In this paper, I pr…
Randolph Clarke. Omissions
Randolph Clarke. Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility
Thinking about Provincialism in Thinking
The Courage of Doing Philosophy
In recent years, the problem if idealization has been one of the central issues discussed in philosophy of science. This volume gathers original essays written by well-known philosophers. The papers address the method of idealization and its applications in science as well as ontological and epistemological problems that have arisen. Among the questions addressed are: What is the logical form of idealizational statements and how should they be in…
Must False Consciousness Be Rationally Caused
Denise Meyerson has recently argued that the adaptational account of false consciousness must appeal to a psychological element, contrary to explicit declarations of its proponents. In order to explain why the rulers genuinely hold ideological beliefs, one must take them to desire to think well of themselves. She concludes that the desire to think well of oneself causes the ideological beliefs. The article defends the adaptational account from Me…
Knowledge of consequences
The Knobe effect (Analysis 63(3):190–194, 2003a) consists in our tendency to attribute intentionality to bringing about a side effect when it is morally bad but not when it is morally good. Beebe and Buckwalter (Mind Lang 25:474–498, 2010) have demonstrated that there is an epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE): people are more inclined to attribute knowledge when the side effect is bad in Knobe-type cases. ESEE is quite robust. In this paper, I pr…
Must False Consciousness Be Rationally Caused
Denise Meyerson has recently argued that the adaptational account of false consciousness must appeal to a psychological element, contrary to explicit declarations of its proponents. In order to explain why the rulers genuinely hold ideological beliefs, one must take them to desire to think well of themselves. She concludes that the desire to think well of oneself causes the ideological beliefs. The article defends the adaptational account from Me…
Must False Consciousness Be Rationally Caused
Denise Meyerson has recently argued that the adaptational account of false consciousness must appeal to a psychological element, contrary to explicit declarations of its proponents. In order to explain why the rulers genuinely hold ideological beliefs, one must take them to desire to think well of themselves. She concludes that the desire to think well of oneself causes the ideological beliefs. The article defends the adaptational account from Me…
The Courage of Doing Philosophy
In recent years, the problem if idealization has been one of the central issues discussed in philosophy of science. This volume gathers original essays written by well-known philosophers. The papers address the method of idealization and its applications in science as well as ontological and epistemological problems that have arisen. Among the questions addressed are: What is the logical form of idealizational statements and how should they be in…
Thinking about Provincialism in Thinking
Randolph Clarke. Omissions
Randolph Clarke. Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility
Knowledge of consequences
The Knobe effect (Analysis 63(3):190–194, 2003a) consists in our tendency to attribute intentionality to bringing about a side effect when it is morally bad but not when it is morally good. Beebe and Buckwalter (Mind Lang 25:474–498, 2010) have demonstrated that there is an epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE): people are more inclined to attribute knowledge when the side effect is bad in Knobe-type cases. ESEE is quite robust. In this paper, I pr…
The Doxastic Heuristic and the Consequence Account of the Epistemic Side-Effect Effect
We discuss two philosophical explanations of the epistemic side-effect effect: the doxastic heuristic account (Alfano et al. The Monist 95 (2): 264–289, 2012) and the consequence account (Paprzycka-Hausman Synthese 197: 5457–5490, 2020). We argue that the doxastic heuristic account has problems with explaining knowledge attributions in cases where the probability that the side effect will occur is low and where the side effect does not ultimately…
Does reflection reduce the epistemic side‐effect effect? A new challenge to error accounts
The epistemic side‐effect effect consists of an asymmetric pattern of knowledge attributions in harm and help cases, paralleling the Knobe effect for intentionality attributions. Error‐based accounts suggest the asymmetries arise from performance errors in harm cases. We challenge this claim with three new experimental studies designed to reduce errors. First, we presented harm and help cases simultaneously. Second, participants completed the cog…
Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (4 works) · Harm (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Attribution (2 works) · Doxastic logic (2 works)