Julian Bacharach
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995995 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Julian Bacharach |
| GIVEN NAMES | Julian |
| FAMILY NAME | Bacharach |
| SIGNATURE | BACHARACH J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Antwerp |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2288-7824 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
A minimalist approach to memory causality
Our commonsense conception of memory involves the idea that when you recall an event from your past, you can do so only because you previously witnessed that event, or were involved in it as an agent or participant. It is all but irresistible to account for this dependence in causal terms: your recollection is explained causally by your earlier experience of the event of which it is a recollection. This should not be confused with the more specif…
Faith in a World of Thinkers. A Critical Notice of
1. Is there any intrinsic connection between self-consciousness and objectivity? How, if at all, must self-conscious subjects take themselves to be related to an objective world, or take themselves
Transient Particulars
We spend much of our adult lives thinking and reminiscing about particular events of the past, which, by their very nature, can never be repeated. What is involved in a capacity to think thoughts of this kind? In this paper, I propose that such thoughts are essentially connected with a capacity to communicate about past events, and specifically in the special way in which events of the past are valued and shared in our relationships with one anot…
Tensed truth, temporal particularity, and the fixity of the past
Relief, time-bias, and the metaphysics of tense
Our emotional lives are full of temporal asymmetries. Salient among these is that we tend to feel differently about painful or unpleasant events depending on their temporal location: we feel anxiety or trepidation about painful events we anticipate in the future, and relief when they are over. One question, then, is whether temporally asymmetric emotions such as relief have any ramifications for the metaphysics of time. On what has become the sta…
Relief, time-bias, and the metaphysics of tense
Our emotional lives are full of temporal asymmetries. Salient among these is that we tend to feel differently about painful or unpleasant events depending on their temporal location: we feel anxiety or trepidation about painful events we anticipate in the future, and relief when they are over. One question, then, is whether temporally asymmetric emotions such as relief have any ramifications for the metaphysics of time. On what has become the sta…
Relief, time-bias, and the metaphysics of tense
Our emotional lives are full of temporal asymmetries. Salient among these is that we tend to feel differently about painful or unpleasant events depending on their temporal location: we feel anxiety or trepidation about painful events we anticipate in the future, and relief when they are over. One question, then, is whether temporally asymmetric emotions such as relief have any ramifications for the metaphysics of time. On what has become the sta…
Transient Particulars
We spend much of our adult lives thinking and reminiscing about particular events of the past, which, by their very nature, can never be repeated. What is involved in a capacity to think thoughts of this kind? In this paper, I propose that such thoughts are essentially connected with a capacity to communicate about past events, and specifically in the special way in which events of the past are valued and shared in our relationships with one anot…
Tensed truth, temporal particularity, and the fixity of the past
Faith in a World of Thinkers. A Critical Notice of
1. Is there any intrinsic connection between self-consciousness and objectivity? How, if at all, must self-conscious subjects take themselves to be related to an objective world, or take themselves
A minimalist approach to memory causality
Our commonsense conception of memory involves the idea that when you recall an event from your past, you can do so only because you previously witnessed that event, or were involved in it as an agent or participant. It is all but irresistible to account for this dependence in causal terms: your recollection is explained causally by your earlier experience of the event of which it is a recollection. This should not be confused with the more specif…
Computer Science (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Philosophy of language (2 works) · Advanced Differential Geometry Research (1 work) · Advanced Mathematical Theories and Applications (1 work)