Michael Barkasi
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996005 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael Barkasi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael |
| FAMILY NAME | Barkasi |
| SIGNATURE | BARKASI M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Washington University in St. Louis |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4070-8196 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Perceiving objects the brain does not represent
Consumer-side reference through promiscuous memory traces
Memory as Sensory Modality, Perception as Experience of the Past
What should the sensorimotor enactivist say about dreams
Dreams provide a compelling problem for sensorimotor enactivists like Alva Noë: they seem to replicate our perceptual experiences without sensorimotor interaction with distal sensory stimuli. Noë has responded by saying that dreams actually fail to replicate perceptual experiences in virtue of their lack of detail and stability. Noë's opponents have replied by pointing out that some dreams are richly detailed and stable, and that instability and …
Does what we dream feel present? Two varieties of presence and implications for measuring presence in VR
Are there epistemic conditions necessary for demonstrative thought
Some Hallucinations Are Experiences of the Past
When you hallucinate an object, you are not in the normal sort of concurrent causal sensory interaction with that object. It's standardly further inferred that the hallucinated object does not actually exist. But the lack of normal concurrent causal sensory interaction does not imply that there does not exist an object that is hallucinated. It might be a past‐perceived object. In this paper, I argue that this claim holds for at least some interes…
Some Hallucinations Are Experiences of the Past
When you hallucinate an object, you are not in the normal sort of concurrent causal sensory interaction with that object. It's standardly further inferred that the hallucinated object does not actually exist. But the lack of normal concurrent causal sensory interaction does not imply that there does not exist an object that is hallucinated. It might be a past‐perceived object. In this paper, I argue that this claim holds for at least some interes…
What should the sensorimotor enactivist say about dreams
Dreams provide a compelling problem for sensorimotor enactivists like Alva Noë: they seem to replicate our perceptual experiences without sensorimotor interaction with distal sensory stimuli. Noë has responded by saying that dreams actually fail to replicate perceptual experiences in virtue of their lack of detail and stability. Noë's opponents have replied by pointing out that some dreams are richly detailed and stable, and that instability and …
Does what we dream feel present? Two varieties of presence and implications for measuring presence in VR
Are there epistemic conditions necessary for demonstrative thought
Memory as Sensory Modality, Perception as Experience of the Past
Perceiving objects the brain does not represent
Consumer-side reference through promiscuous memory traces
Psychology (6 works) · Cognitive psychology (5 works) · Cognitive science (5 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Perception (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works)