Dario Mortini
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996257 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dario Mortini |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dario |
| FAMILY NAME | Mortini |
| SIGNATURE | MORTINI D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Glasgow |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9003-4789 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Evidentially Hedged Assertions and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion
Speakers make evidentially hedged assertions when they weaken commitment to what they assert in virtue of disclosing imperfectly reliable sources of evidence in their assertions. A novel and increasingly influential case for the knowledge norm of assertion appeals to multiple strands of linguistic data on evidentially hedged assertions. This paper offers a critical evaluation of these data and shows that they do not clearly support the knowledge …
Hedged conjunctions and norms of assertion
What is the norm of assertion? Promising answers to this question exploit explanatory considerations: candidate norms should provide the best explanation of multiple strands of linguistic data. Recently, hedged conjunctions have been offered as a new strand of linguistic data best explained by the knowledge norm of assertion. In this paper, my aim is two-fold. First, I challenge both this explanation and other norm-based explanations of hedged co…
Etiological proper function and the safety condition
In this paper, I develop and motivate a novel formulation of the safety condition in terms of etiological proper function. After testing this condition against the most pressing objections to safety-theoretic accounts of knowledge in the literature, my conclusion will be the following: once safety is suitably understood in terms of etiological proper function, it stands a better chance as the right anti-Gettier condition on knowledge
Knowledge, individualised evidence and luck
The notion of individualised evidence holds the key to solve the puzzle of statistical evidence, but there’s still no consensus on how exactly to define it. To make progress on the problem, epistemologists have proposed various accounts of individualised evidence in terms of causal or modal anti-luck conditions on knowledge like appropriate causation (Thomson 1986), sensitivity (Enoch et al. 2012) and safety (Pritchard 2018). In this paper, I sho…
A new solution to the safety dilemma
Despite the substantial appeal of the safety condition, Kelp (J Philos Res 34:21–31, 2009; Am Philos Q 53:27–37; Good Thinking. A Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology, Routledge, London, 2018) has raised a difficult challenge for safety-theoretic accounts of knowledge. By combining Gettier-style fake barn cases with epistemic Frankfurt cases, he concludes that no formulation of safety can be strong enough to predict ignorance in the former and wea…
A new solution to the safety dilemma
Despite the substantial appeal of the safety condition, Kelp (J Philos Res 34:21–31, 2009; Am Philos Q 53:27–37; Good Thinking. A Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology, Routledge, London, 2018) has raised a difficult challenge for safety-theoretic accounts of knowledge. By combining Gettier-style fake barn cases with epistemic Frankfurt cases, he concludes that no formulation of safety can be strong enough to predict ignorance in the former and wea…
Knowledge, individualised evidence and luck
The notion of individualised evidence holds the key to solve the puzzle of statistical evidence, but there’s still no consensus on how exactly to define it. To make progress on the problem, epistemologists have proposed various accounts of individualised evidence in terms of causal or modal anti-luck conditions on knowledge like appropriate causation (Thomson 1986), sensitivity (Enoch et al. 2012) and safety (Pritchard 2018). In this paper, I sho…
A new solution to the safety dilemma
Despite the substantial appeal of the safety condition, Kelp (J Philos Res 34:21–31, 2009; Am Philos Q 53:27–37; Good Thinking. A Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology, Routledge, London, 2018) has raised a difficult challenge for safety-theoretic accounts of knowledge. By combining Gettier-style fake barn cases with epistemic Frankfurt cases, he concludes that no formulation of safety can be strong enough to predict ignorance in the former and wea…
Etiological proper function and the safety condition
In this paper, I develop and motivate a novel formulation of the safety condition in terms of etiological proper function. After testing this condition against the most pressing objections to safety-theoretic accounts of knowledge in the literature, my conclusion will be the following: once safety is suitably understood in terms of etiological proper function, it stands a better chance as the right anti-Gettier condition on knowledge
Evidentially Hedged Assertions and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion
Speakers make evidentially hedged assertions when they weaken commitment to what they assert in virtue of disclosing imperfectly reliable sources of evidence in their assertions. A novel and increasingly influential case for the knowledge norm of assertion appeals to multiple strands of linguistic data on evidentially hedged assertions. This paper offers a critical evaluation of these data and shows that they do not clearly support the knowledge …
Hedged conjunctions and norms of assertion
What is the norm of assertion? Promising answers to this question exploit explanatory considerations: candidate norms should provide the best explanation of multiple strands of linguistic data. Recently, hedged conjunctions have been offered as a new strand of linguistic data best explained by the knowledge norm of assertion. In this paper, my aim is two-fold. First, I challenge both this explanation and other norm-based explanations of hedged co…
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works) · Assertion (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Advanced Algebra and Logic (1 work) · Appeal (1 work)